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Abstract
As non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and organized transnational crime
gain greater prominence around the globe, the need for international cooperation against
these non-state actors has consequently acquired greater urgency. Due to the cross-boundary
nature of these activities, international cooperation is particularly critical for eradicating these
threats. This thesis analyzes a particular instance of a non-state threat, maritime piracy, and
uses it as a probe for understanding the nature of international cooperation vis-a-vis non-state
actors. I observe a somewhat surprising trend while collating a database of all instances of
international cooperation against maritime piracy throughout the world - Asia, and in particular
Southeast Asia, has been the source of a disproportionately high level of international
cooperation that is focused on eradicating the piracy problem. Furthermore, this trend has
occurred even though Asia is often regarded as lacking the conditions necessary for
international cooperation in the traditional security domain - binding multilateral institutions
that can facilitate the institutionalization of cooperation agreements, as well as a hegemonic
power with the ability to enforce cooperation. What has enabled international cooperation
against maritime piracy to flourish in Asia, and what does this imply about non-traditional
forms of security cooperation?
I propose that non-traditional security cooperation has thrived in Asia for at least two
unconventional reasons - the ability of non-binding institutions such as ASEAN to facilitate and
promote non-traditional security cooperation, as well as the effective use of national coast
guard agencies to avoid the political sensitivities that often result from security cooperation in
the traditional domain. I make these arguments by relying on evidence post-processed from
two international datasets that I have collated - one on the instances of international
cooperation against maritime piracy, and another on the geographical distribution of piracy
attacks over time. It is hoped that these datasets, made publicly available for the first time, will
be expanded upon for further research by the academic community. Finally, non-traditional
forms of security threats appear to greater enable national governments to leverage off their
commonality of interests to promote cooperation, and may even be an important confidence-
building measure for generating greater cooperation in the traditional security domain in
future.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Motivation
With the end of the Cold War, non-traditional security issues have risen in prominence.
The September 11 attacks on the United States brought the subject of international terrorism
to the top of the global security agenda, and threats from non-state actors, such as terrorism,
maritime piracy, transnational organized crime, etc. have since gained prominence as an area of
academic and policy research. Some scholars have even argued that transnational threats are
"perhaps the major threat to the world system", and that fighting against non-state actors will
be the "new wars of globalization", with states increasingly on the losing side.'
Non-state threats encompass a wide variety of problems that states have to grapple
with, and general characteristic of threats that fall under this category include the sub-state or
trans-state origins of the threat's actors, as well as the multi-dimensional and multi-directional
outcomes that the actors seek to achieve. With the exception of terrorism, the fundamental
existence of the state is also seldom threatened. For these reasons, the threats are not always
effectively neutralized by traditional military means, and there is an urgent need for
international cooperation amongst national governments to effectively combat the problem.
Victor Cha, for instance, suggests that both security enforcement efforts and the containment
of non-state threats will be increasingly ineffective through national or unilateral means.2 Drug
traffickers, terrorists, pirates and other transnational criminals cross international borders
1 See (Strange, 1996), p. 121 and (Naim, 2002)
2 See (Cha, 2000), p. 394
freely, whereas national law enforcement agencies are bounded by international law to the
territorial confines of their own countries. The perception that these threats are not as
dangerous as their traditional counterparts also often reduces the priority that individual
governments place on eradicating the problem. Without effective international cooperation
across international borders, non-state threats will therefore continue to proliferate.
Unfortunately, international cooperation is difficult to achieve. Here, cooperation must
be distinguished from harmony, which is accomplished simply from a synchronization of
interests amongst different actors.3 In contrast, cooperation materializes only when conflicting
and complementary interests are involved, and actors actively adjust their actions and
behaviors to make them aligned with the preferences of others. Based on this definition, not
only does the need for compromises and sacrifices from all agents make cooperation difficult,
but furthermore, cooperation at the international level often becomes even more elusive due
to the anarchic international system that persists in society today. In the 1980s, for instance,
the central question of international relations theory was why states in an "atomistic, anarchic,
Hobbesian" international system would even want to cooperate with each other in the first
place.4
The prospects for international cooperation become even less promising when one
focuses on cooperation against non-state threats. Given that these threats are often considered
more of a nuisance rather than threatening the fundamental existence of nation states,
3 This definition of cooperation was adopted from (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985)
4 See (O'Neill, Balsiger, & VanDeveer, 2004; Waltz, 1979),
national governments often exhibit reduced enthusiasm and willingness towards making the
necessary compromises to tackle the problem effectively.
1.2 Maritime piracy in Asia
Given the difficulties in promoting international cooperation, this thesis analyzes the
nature of international cooperation against non-traditional security threats by empirically
analyzing the problem of maritime piracy. A classic example of a non-state threat that has long
existed in international society, maritime piracy refers to any act of armed robbery that uses
violence, or the threat of violence, in remote areas of the sea, with the focus on achieving
financial gain.5 Often operating within and across the maritime territorial borders of coastal
states, maritime pirates evidently exhibit the trans-state nature common amongst non-state
actors, since pirates "do not recognize the interstate borders sanctioned by international law
and treaties".6
s See (Johnson & Valencia, 2005), p. xi
6 (G. Ong, 2005).
YEARLY STATISTICS OF INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED SINCE 1984 (WORLDWIDE)
Figure 1 Yearly statistics of piracy incidents throughout the world since 1984, sorted by region. (Source: (IMO,
2007))
Although the maritime piracy threat has existed since time immemorial, I have
witnessed a significant escalation of the problem over the past two decades. Figure 1
underscores the extent of this problem by displaying the number of piracy incidents that have
occurred annually between 1984 and 2006. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the annual
rate of piracy incidents globally has increased dramatically, reaching a peak of nearly 500
attacks in 2000, or an average rate of more than one piracy attack per day. In 2007, the piracy
threat has continued to persist with 263 ship attacks recorded throughout the world, out of
which the territorial waters of Nigeria and Somalia witnessed the highest levels of piracy
attacks.7
7 International Maritime Bureau, "Reported piracy incidents rise sharply in 2007", London, (9 January 2008)
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Maritime piracy has been particularly rampant in Asia. As shown in Figure 1, the South
China Sea and the Malacca Straits together consistently account for more than half of all piracy
attacks in the world. This is particularly worrying because the two bodies of water make up an
important portion of the world's Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and lie on the busiest
shipping trade route between the East and the West. In particular, the Malacca Straits is one of
the most congested waterways in the world, and any security threat in those waters could
significantly disrupt the international global trade system. Underscoring this growing security
threat, the British insurance giant Lloyd's of London declared in June 2004 that the Malacca
Straits was a high war-risk area. Since 2001, the maritime piracy threat has further taken on an
added dimension, after the international community realized that a piracy attack could easily
act as a cover for a maritime-based terrorist attack. Instead of merely pursuing financial gain,
terrorists with a political agenda could hijack a commercial ship and drive it into a busy sea
port, causing unimaginable damage to the region.
International cooperation is critical for combating maritime piracy effectively. The
actions of a single state alone are usually inadequate to combat the problem, because even
though pirates disregard international boundaries when attacking merchant ships, law
enforcers are constrained by the very same boundaries to avoid infringing the sovereignty of
neighboring states. In the absence of international cooperation, pirates can evade arrest by
crossing these borders. Indeed, as Singapore's former Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Tony Tan,
reiterated, "Individual state action is not enough. The oceans are indivisible and maritime
security threats do not respect boundaries". 8 Consistent and comprehensive multilateral
cooperation is the only solution to this growing problem.
Yet, the high incidence of piracy attacks in Asia does not immediately imply that
international cooperation would naturally materialize to tackle the problem. In contrast,
traditional theories on international cooperation, which heretofore have focused on
cooperation against security threats from other nation states, would have predicted that
international cooperation should not be witnessed in Asia. As elaborated upon in the literature
review presented in Chapter 2, the academic literature, at one extreme, is led by neoliberal
institutionalists emphasizing the establishment of strong multilateral institutions with the
binding power to enforce cooperation amongst sovereign nation states. Alternatively,
cooperation could result via Charles Kindleberger's hegemonic stability theory (Kindleberger,
1986), where a strong hegemonic power in the region possesses the political clout to enforce
the necessary cooperation amongst the nation states.
If we cross-apply either of the hypotheses to the non-traditional security domain in a
naive manner, Asia would be an unlikely candidate for witnessing international cooperation
against maritime piracy. Despite the presence of regional institutions such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, and the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), it is often lamented that Asia lacks the well-institutionalized
framework that is necessary for regional cooperation, especially in contrast to regions such as
8 Tony Tan, "Maritime Security after September 1 1," International Institute for Strategic Studies conference,
Singapore, 1 June 2003.
Europe. 9 Regarded as no more than a "talk shop" for government officials, the regional
institutions are perceived by many academics and policy analysts to hold little promise for
security cooperation in Asia, since their non-binding nature make them unlikely to be the
foundation for meaningful collaboration amongst nation states.
The lack of strong multilateral institutions in the region may provide less cause for
pessimism towards the prospects of cooperation if Asian states were less averse to the
presence of a global hegemon in the region, which would have enabled the hegemonic stability
theory to operate. Instead, coastal states in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia and Indonesia,
have expressed unequivocal opposition towards any security role offered by potential
hegemons such as the United States Navy. This opposition was best represented by the coastal
states' hostile reaction to US Admiral Thomas Fargo's pronouncement for a Regional Maritime
Security Initiative (RMSI) in 2004.10 Citing sovereignty sensitivities, the coastal states have
managed to repel hegemonic attempts to enforce cooperation in the region, in the process
reducing the likelihood of future cooperation with the United States. Traditional theories of
international cooperation therefore suggest that the Asian region should be devoid of any
meaningful cooperation against maritime piracy.
Nevertheless, empirical data suggests that Asia has become the center of maritime
piracy cooperation in the world. My data collation of all instances of cooperation against
maritime piracy amongst nation states, which I describe in Chapter 4, reveals that the large
9(Tsunekawa, 2005).
1o (Bradford, 2005)
majority of all piracy cooperation in the world has been established in Asia. The MALSINDO
coordinated patrols, which commenced in 2004 between the navies of Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia to secure the Malacca Straits against piracy attacks, the Information Sharing Center
established in 2006 in Singapore as part of a 11-country Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), as well as the frequent
joint anti-piracy exercises amongst law enforcement agencies in the region are just some of the
cooperation that have developed over the past decade.
This plethora of cooperation efforts appears to have borne fruit. Since 2004, the
number of piracy attacks in the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea has fallen, both in
absolute terms and as a proportion of global piracy incidents. In August 2006, Lloyd's list lifted
the war-risk insurance rating on the Malacca Straits, and in 2008, the IMB announced that
Indonesia no longer ranked as having the highest number of reported incidents in the world.
According to the IMB, much of the overall decrease in piracy attacks in the Malacca Straits can
be attributed to the enhanced cooperation amongst the coastal states."
This data just described presents an empirical puzzle. Why has there been international
cooperation in a region which neither has strong, binding, regional institutions that can create
and enforce international cooperation, nor strong hegemonic powers that can coerce states
into cooperating? How should traditional theories of international security cooperation be
modified in the context of non-state threats such as maritime piracy?
11 International Maritime Bureau, "Piracy figures up by 20% for first quarter of 2008", London, (16 April 2008)
These questions are particularly relevant today, because despite the growing threat of
non-state actors to state security throughout the world, international cooperation vis-a-vis
maritime piracy remains under-studied. Few analysts have written about maritime piracy
cooperation, even though a significant amount of data on maritime piracy is readily available,
especially if contrasted against other non-state threats such as terrorism. Greg Chaikin suggests
that the international relations scholarship has largely neglected the maritime realm because it
appears to play a minor supporting role in international order matters". 12 This role, however,
appears to be increasing, and hence an understanding of international cooperation against
maritime piracy will be a timely contribution to the existing literature.
Finally, it is worth noting here that while I do observe international cooperation against
maritime piracy throughout the Asian continent, I specifically notice disproportionate levels of
cooperation targeted at the Southeast Asian region, centered on the waters encompassed by
the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea. Nevertheless, I regard the cooperation that has
developed as an Asian-wide phenomenon, since much of the resultant cooperation has in fact
involved many Asian nations external to the Southeast Asian region. In particular, Japan and
India have played instrumental roles in evoking international cooperation against maritime
piracy, targeted at both Southeast Asia and the greater Asian region.
12 See (Chaikin, 2005).
1.3 Problem Statement
This thesis attempts to solve an empirical puzzle that was witnessed. Although Asia, and
specifically Southeast Asia, is often said to lack the pre-requisite conditions for international
security cooperation, such as the presence of binding, multilateral regional institutions and a
strong hegemonic power, this region nevertheless appears to be a leader in international
cooperation against maritime piracy, and this cooperation has led to a decrease in maritime
piracy incidents in the region.
I therefore attempt to answer a three-part question in this thesis:
1) Has meaningful cooperation against maritime piracy actually taken place in Asia?
2) Assuming that cooperation has emerged, what explains how this cooperation has
materialized, given the lack of strong multilateral institutions in the region, as well as
the aversion of small Asian states to security hegemons?
3) How does cooperation against non-state threats differ from traditional forms of security
cooperation?
Through a data collection of all instances of cooperation against maritime piracy, I attempt to
find trends that provide alternative explanations of how this cooperation has developed.
1.4 Summary of Findings
Our analysis of maritime piracy in Asia has revealed the following phenomenon:
1) A network of bilateral cooperation has developed against maritime piracy in Asia.
However, instead of implying the irrelevance of non-binding regional institutions such as
ASEAN, the increasing spread of cooperation in fact suggests that these institutions have
played an important role of providing a platform for the diffusion of cooperation ideas,
thereby promoting future cooperation against non-state threats.
2) International cooperation, especially those between coastal states and extra-regional
powers, has been greatly facilitated by the use of national coast guards as the proxies
for cooperation. These law enforcement agencies can promote significant cross-
boundary interaction such as joint exercises, joint patrols, transfer of military equipment
and training programs without raising the sovereignty sensitivities of the coastal states.
3) Comparing between traditional and non-traditional forms of security cooperation, I
observe that not only are there greater prospects for cooperation against non-
traditional security threats, but somewhat ironically, cooperation in the non-traditional
security domain may even be providing unique opportunities for greater cooperation in
the traditional security domain.
4) Finally, I have made efforts towards compiling a database of all instances of
international cooperation against maritime piracy, and hope that this database will
facilitate further research on international cooperation against maritime piracy in
future.
1.5 Thesis Roadmap
The rest of the thesis elaborates on the above findings. I begin by detailing the pre-
requisites necessary for the analysis in subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2, I survey the
academic literature for prevailing theories on international cooperation, identifying the key
areas of debate in the literature, and summarizing five hypotheses that posit what the
conditions necessary for international cooperation are. Chapter 3 then focuses on the threat of
maritime piracy, describing the nature of the threat, the need for international cooperation to
effectively tackle the problem, the difficulties in promoting international cooperation against
maritime piracy in Asia. Finally, I also survey the conditions that piracy experts have suggested
to enhance international cooperation on this issue.
Chapter 4 begins the analysis portion of the thesis by first reporting the methodology
and results of our data collation of all instances of maritime piracy cooperation in Asia. Using
the empirical data, I not only show that significant cooperation against maritime piracy has
been achieved in the region, but also that the cooperation appears to have been effective in
combating the piracy problem.
The next two chapters hypothesize alternative reasons that explain why cooperation has
materialized in Asia. Chapter 5 focuses on the dynamics within ASEAN, and argues that not only
has there been a growing web of bilateral cooperation between countries in the region, but
that the frequently-dismissed ASEAN multilateral institution provides a necessary platform for
the spreading and strengthening of the cooperation network. Chapter 6 expands the
geographical area of analysis further, analyzing the nature of cooperation between the coastal
states, where most of the piracy attacks occur, and the extra-regional powers, which often have
the necessary resources to tackle the problem effectively. I suggest that non-traditional forms
of security cooperation, such as through the use of national coast guard agencies, have proven
to be important facilitators of international cooperation in the security domain, especially in a
region such as ASEAN, whose history has resulted in much aversion to extra-regional
involvement.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by contrasting cooperation against traditional
and non-traditional security threats, before suggesting areas for future work.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review on International Cooperation
Let us begin by exploring and understanding the theoretical background required for
this thesis. In this chapter, I survey the international relations literature for theories of
international cooperation, and in particular, describe the conditions that have been
hypothesized as being necessary for promoting international cooperation amongst sovereign
nation states in an anarchic international system. As mentioned in Chapter 1, I note that the
literature has thus far focused on theorizing in the context of traditional security cooperation
against other state threats, and that there has not been an attempt to extrapolate these
theories towards non-state security cooperation. Nevertheless, I rely on these traditional
theories as a baseline for subsequent analysis, wondering if these theories are sufficient for
understanding international cooperation against non-state actors.
2.1 Realism vs. Neo-liberalism: What is the Cooperation Debate?
In order to place the theories in context, however, let us first take a step back and
understand the overall positions that major schools of thought in political science have adopted
towards international cooperation. This is useful since it is noted that political science students
often wrongly characterize the debate between the realists and the neo-liberalists over the
nature of international cooperation.13 Robert Jervis (Jervis, 1999), for instance, notes that there
is a common misperception that realists believe that there is little prospect for international
cooperation because the world is constantly in a state of anarchy, and that the pursuit of power
is a zero-sum game. On the other hand, neo-liberal institutionalists are perceived to be big
13 (Jervis, 1999)
proponents of institutions because institutionalists are the only ones who accept that
cooperation exists and believe that institutions are effective in promoting cooperation.
Instead, the distinction is much more subtle. Both schools of thought agree that the lack
of an overarching, sovereign international organization prevents the enforcement of binding
agreements among states, making it simultaneously harder and more critical for there to be
international cooperation. Furthermore, both sides do not deny that cooperation exists, nor do
they disagree that an anarchic international society best describes international politics today.
For instance, realists are not blind to the fact that states do cooperate with one another, and
that multilateral institutions such as NATO are strong facilitators of international cooperation.
Instead, the distinction lies in their beliefs regarding the necessity of conflicts in world politics,
the level of unrealized cooperation in society, as well as their perceptions of the role of
institutions in promoting cooperation.
Here, offensive realists, led by John Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 2003), argue that
because states are in constant pursuit of power, conflicts that still persist in international
politics represent the incompatibility of desires amongst different states in the world.
Offensive realists therefore argue that there is little room for increasing cooperation because
even the provision of more information will not lead to changes in preferences over state
strategies. Originating from the subfield of international security, where there is often much
grandstanding amongst nation states, it is perhaps unsurprising that offensive realists have a
pessimistic view of the value of cooperation in international politics.
In contrast, neoliberals such as Robert Keohane, Robert Axelrod and Duncan Snidal
(Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Snidal, 1991) tend to focus on state cooperation in the context of
international political economy and the environment. They believe that much international
cooperation remains unrealized because of the failure of the international community to
employ a wider range of institutions, which would move international society towards a Pareto
frontier and maximize the gains for all sides. They argue that with better information about the
interests and intentions of the other parties, state preferences can change, and cooperation
can result. I return to the debate on the role of institutions in promoting cooperation later in
this chapter.
Finally, the middle ground in this debate is occupied by defensive realists such as Robert
Jervis, Stephen Van Evera and Stephen Walt (Jervis, 1978; Van Evera, 1998; Waltz, 1979). They
argue that it is the intentions of states, rather than their inherent power, that determines
whether conflict is necessary, and thereby whether international cooperation is even possible.
In this regard, Robert Jervis' notion of the security dilemma identifies the conditions under
which defensive realists believe states will cooperate - when the offense/defense balance is
tilted in favor of defensive postures, and when it is possible to distinguish between offensive
and defensive postures. They therefore argue that cooperation can be enhanced by making
known one's intentions, so long as there are no outwardly aggressive states that have to be
dealt with.
2.2 International Cooperation in the 80s: A Game-Theoretic Approach
According to Helen Milner (Milner, 1992), the academic focus on international
cooperation began in the 1970s, as states started actively cooperating over security and
economic issues for the first time since the end of the World War. Over the next decade, the
theoretical literature on international cooperation adopted a strong game-theoretic focus,
emphasizing the use of matrix games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Staghunt, and Chicken to
analyze international politics. In these games, a number of agents choose from a set of possible
actions, and the joint combination of actions determines the rewards for each agent. Out of this
systemic analysis, three sets of hypotheses have emerged. Together, they "suggest a series of
variables that might affect the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation among nations", 14
though this observation does not imply that the academic community has reached a consensus
on the relative importance of these variables, nor are the scholars in each sub-field united in
their conclusions.
2.2.1 Absolute vs. Relative Gains
First, building off the realist-neoliberal debate, the potential for cooperation varies
depending on whether states are assumed to seek absolute or relative gains. On the one hand,
Robert Axelrod (Axelrod, 1984) proposes that rational states are focused on maximizing their
absolute gains, and thus suggests the use of a Tit-for-Tat approach to discourage cheating and
encourage cooperation. Robert Keohane (Keohane, 1986b) proposes a similar principle of
14 (Milner, 1992), p. 470
reciprocity, so that states realize that they will be rewarded for cooperating and punished
otherwise.
Realists, however, challenge the absolute gains assumption, and instead contend that
states pursue relative gains, constantly comparing their absolute gains with those of other
states. Waltz suggests that even when mutual gain can be achieved through cooperation, states
will "ask not 'Will both of us gain?' but 'Who will gain more?'". 15 Extrapolating from this, Joseph
Greico's (Grieco, 1990) central argument posits that cooperation should never occur, except
when a perfectly "balanced", or "equitable" achievement of gains is achieved.
In a return salvo, Duncan Snidal (Snidal, 1991) argues that while states do seek relative
gains, this pursuit is only consequential in limited scenarios, such as in a two-actor case and/or
a prisoner's dilemma situation. Indeed, Keohane (Keohane, 1986a) further argues that when
interstate threat is low, the security dilemma becomes less relevant, and states may be willing
to let other states gain the relative advantage in an exchange.
Ultimately, however, there have been doubts about whether the debate in this area
actually matters. Helen Milner notes that despite the different assumptions, the proposed
cooperation outcome, a balanced distribution of gains, is similar under both the absolute and
relative gains assumptions. 16 Similarly, Robert Jervis suggests in more recent times that realists
have moved away from their insistence on relative gains as states' primary interest, in
5 (Waltz, 1979), p. 105
16 (Milner, 1992)
recognition that international politics is not always a zero-sum game. 17 In the same light,
neoliberals agree that it is nai've to believe that states have no regard of how their gains
compare relatively to their counterparts. Underlying these observations is Jervis' criticism that
academics during this period were too obsessed with analyzing international cooperation at the
game-theoretic level, thereby failing to explore the conditions under which states exhibit either
the relative or absolute gain behaviors. 18
2.2.2 Number of Actors
Another area of debate centers on the optimal number of cooperating states for
successful, sustained cooperation. The traditional hypothesis, as Kenneth Oye (Oye, 1986)
describes, suggests that cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of players increase,
since not only does the likelihood for defection by one of the parties increase, but the feasibility
of sanctioning defectors diminishes and information costs rise. Cooperation between just two
states is therefore ideal, and the likelihood of cooperation materializing diminishes as the
number of players increase.
However, the interplay of other factors may instead suggest that fewer actors may not
actually be better for cooperation. Greico (Grieco, 1990) argues that having more states may
actually be more conducive for cooperation, since this provides more opportunities for
exchanges and side payments. A larger number of partners increases the likelihood that each of
the states will at least find some interaction within the multilateral cooperation that is in its
17 (Jervis, 1999)
18 (Jervis, 1999)
overall interest. In addition, more actors may be useful when states are focused on maximizing
relative gains, since competitors will be less united in a multilateral setting, as Snidal suggests.19
In such an environment, coalitions can be formed amongst a subset of the cooperation
partners, enabling individual states to feel more secure against losing out.
Finally, Charles Lipson (Lipson, 1984) provides some form of synthesis by showing that
even if a small number of actors is more conducive for cooperation, a large number of actors
may still be able to cooperate if they are sub-divided into smaller groups. Each instance of
cooperation only involves a subset of the group, but together, a large group of actors are
interlinked in a cooperation network. Evidently, the jury is still out on the effect, if any, of the
number of actors on the likelihood for cooperation. Indeed, Milner summarizes by observing
that insufficient empirical analysis has been carried out, and thus the causal relationship has
not been fully understood. 20
2.2.3 Iteration effect
Finally, another hypothesis resulting from cooperation theorists' heavy emphasis on
game theory proposes that the willingness of states to cooperate increases when they believe
that they will continue to interact indefinitely. Game theory suggests that when agents assume
that the game is not a one-off interaction, the value of maintaining a reputation for being an
actor who is willing to cooperate outweighs the short-term benefit of defection. Unfortunately,
while most scholars agree that iteration enhances cooperation, this has little prescriptive value,
19 (Snidal, 1991)
20 (Milner, 1992), p. 474
since as Oye recognizes, "with the possible exception of global thermonuclear war,
international politics is characterized by the expectation of future interaction".21 This has led
Milner to lament that there has been little theorizing about "what conditions generate enough
iteration or a low enough discount rate to induce cooperative behavior". 2 2
Instead, the debate surrounds whether iteration is a structural variable, or if it is
manipulable by the actors. At one end, Oye posits that for iteration to work, the structure of
each successive round of play must not be altered, and that the norms of cooperation must be
explicitly codified. 23 On the other hand, Axelrod and Keohane, as described above, suggest that
it is instead how the actors exchange their gains, such as through a tit-for-tat, a strategy of
reciprocity, or a tactic of decomposition which enhances cooperation amongst states. Milner
further suggests that actors may vary the degree of iteration based on their expectations, and
hence there is a need to account for subjective evaluations24 .
2.3 Cooperation in the 90s: The Institutions Debate
As the international political system underwent a significant shift with the end of the
Cold War, a similar shift appeared to occur within the academic literature on international
cooperation. Perhaps due to the spirited debates of the role of international institutions such as
NATO and the UN in a post-Cold War era, academics focused on analyzing the role of
institutions and regimes in promoting international cooperation. Indeed, Randall Schweller and
21 (Oye, 1986), p. 12
22 (Milner, 1992), p. 474-475
23 (Oye, 1986), p. 16
24 (Milner, 1992), p. 475
David Priess (Schweller & Priess, 1997) suggest that no topic in international relations theory
generated more debate in the 1990s than the role of international institutions.
Despite such proclamations, however, it is doubtful that the shift is as drastic as one
might have imagined. The definition used by academics for what constitutes an institution is
broad, inclusive of any "enduring pattern of shared expectations of behavior that have received
some degree of formal assent". 25 Such a broad definition not only includes formal international
organizations that act directly as agents that influence state preferences and options, but also
encompasses any form of international norm, belief, and knowledge that moves the
international system away from an absolute state of anarchy. Indeed, Kenneth Abbott and
Duncan Snidal (Abbott & Snidal, 1998) have lamented that the academic literature has dealt
with institutions "at such a general level that it has little to say about the particular institutional
arrangements that organize international politics", and have instead focused on the role of
"formal international organizations" in promoting international cooperation. In effect, what this
institutions debate has done is to shift the literature's focus from assuming a game theoretic
structure in analyzing international cooperation to one that challenges the underlying
assumption of whether such a structure should even be used to analyze international
cooperation. In the process, the debate has also become the center battling ground of the
major schools of thought, realism and neo-liberalism, in international relations.
25 (Jervis, 1999)
2.3.1 Formal International Organizations
We first focus on the role of formal international organizations, which Abbott and Snidal
have identified as institutions that distinguish themselves from their alternatives by having the
unique characteristics of centralization and independence - they must have a central, concrete
organization structure and be able to act with a degree of autonomy within defined spheres. 26
Placing emphasis on this subset of institutions provides a more tangible answer to the question
of what conditions are necessary for promoting international cooperation, in contrast to the
constructivist approach of analyzing ongoing social processes and prevailing ideas.
Unsurprisingly, neoliberal institutionalists are optimistic about these institutions,
arguing that these organizations help promote cooperation by changing the pattern of
transaction costs, and that the information shared by international regimes helps reduce
cheating and promotes compliance, thus "lengthening the shadow of cooperation".27 Similarly,
Peter Hass (Haas, 1990) suggests that such institutions ensure the extensiveness and durability
of cooperation by reducing the uncertainty in the relationship. 28 According to Jervis, institutions
can operate in three distinct ways. First, by binding states to agree to particular sets of actions,
institutions make it more difficult and costly to defect in the future, enabling the international
system to shift away from anarchy towards mutual preferences between states. Furthermore,
institutions create an even greater potential for cooperation, since the spread of information
and understanding could herald cooperation that political leaders themselves may be unaware
26(Abbott & Snidal, 1998)
27 See (Keohane, 1984), (Axelrod, 1984), (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985)28 Haas (1990), p. 57
of. Finally, institutions may have an important dynamic effect of not just binding states and
preferences to particular sets of outcomes, but may even result in a deeper change in how
states perceive their own interests. For instance, although NATO's mission remained constant
throughout the Cold War, state officials have now become more enthusiastic towards joint
action through NATO as a foreign policy tool, rather than resorting to unilateral action. 29
At the other end, realists challenge the independence assumption of these institutions
by arguing that these institutions, rather than having a life of their own, are mere instruments
of statecraft. John Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 1994) provides the strongest attack, arguing
that institutions "have no independent effect on state behavior" because neoliberal
institutionalists have underestimated the barriers to cooperation that exist in an anarchic
international system, such as the distribution of the gains that arise from cooperation. States
do cooperate through institutions, but these institutions merely reflect that the states involved
are already seeking the goals that the institutions are trying to achieve, rather than the
institutions acting as an independent agent that can alter state preferences. Similarly, Charles
Glaser (Glaser, 1996) argues that institutions are "the product of the same factors... that
influence whether states should cooperate", suggesting that rather than being a remedy to
enhance cooperation, they are merely a by-product of a process that would otherwise have
taken place anyway. Indeed, Mearsheimer argues that the neoliberals have not presented
enough empirical evidence to prove that instances of cooperation would not have materialized
in the absence of these institutions, while Joseph Grieco (Grieco, 1990) further suggests that
29 (Jervis, 1999), p. 61
this focus on international regimes misses the fact that an earlier bargain had already taken
place to create the regime. In addition, regimes may even be detrimental if the established
norms hinder cooperation, as Ralf Emmers (Emmers, 2003) argues in the case of ASEAN's norm
of nonintervention.
Despite the differences, however, it is worth noting that both schools of thought
implicitly assume the need for these international organizations to be binding in nature, i.e.
that they can hold individual states accountable to the cooperation agreements that have
agreed upon. Even if there is always the risk of defection, both sides agree that these
institutions are created because, as Jervis notes, "national leaders want them to have binding
effects". 30 The difference lies in the targets of the binding commitments - realists argue that
institutions are used to bind others to their commitments, whereas neoliberals suggest that it is
equally as important for states to use these institutions to bind themselves and show
commitment towards cooperation. Without the ability to enforce a binding agreement, it is
often assumed that states will either cheat on agreements or reach agreements that do not
actually require much change in state behavior.
2.3.2 Hegemonic Stability Theory: Unilateral Institutions
A final hypothesis that emerges from the literature suggests that imbalances in power
within the international political system may actually be conducive to international
cooperation. Initially proposed by Kindleberger (Kindleberger, 1986) in the 1970s and 80s, this
30 (Jervis, 1999), p. 300
31 (Abbott & Snidal, 1998)
theory regained relevance when the international system became dominated by a single power
after the Cold War. According to this theory, hegemons may be able to generate international
cooperation by possessing the capability to impose cooperation on weaker states. Conybeare
(Conybeare, 1985) further suggests that these asymmetries increase the likelihood of
retaliation in the event of defection, while Lipson argues that asymmetry allows for the
reduction in the number of actors, which then facilitates cooperation.
Here, the literature differs on the ideal distribution of carrots and sticks for facilitating
cooperation. Young (0. R. Young, 1986) suggests that hegemons can impose cooperation
agreements using coercion and brute force, regardless of the preferences of the weaker
partners. Alternatively, Albert Hirschman (Hirschman, 1980) suggests "the influence effect" for
generating cooperation, a more devious version of the hegemonic stability theory by actively
fostering asymmetric interdependence between the hegemon and the weaker state. Finally, a
more benevolent option is proposed, where hegemons promote cooperation by both inciting
fear amongst weaker states, as well as actively providing carrots for weaker states to accept
their leadership. This is often done by having the hegemons cover the startup costs of the
cooperation, since not only is it the only state with the necessary resources to provide the
collective goods of cooperation, but it also often has the overriding interests for doing so.
Indeed, Grieco and Haas found that under such institutional structures, weaker states tended to
get the better terms of cooperation.32
32 (Grieco, 1990; Haas, 1990).
2.4 Evaluation
This brief literature review on international cooperation has focused on identifying the
key debates within the academic community, especially with reference to the conditions
necessary for international state cooperation. Although we have identified five different
hypotheses that attempt to explain how cooperation materializes amongst sovereign states, as
Milner notes, each hypothesis "has its own problems and has only limited empirical support".33
This is especially since the literature tends to adopt a very systemic focus, relying on much
theorizing without the methodological testing of the theories on empirical evidence.
More importantly, the surveyed literature, where it applies to issues of security, has
focused on international cooperation to tackle traditional forms of security threats; in most
situations, the alternative to cooperation among states is interstate conflict. Yet, today's
context suggests that cooperation is also needed to counter transnational threats such as
terrorism and non-state actors, and hence the game-theoretic models that scholars above have
frequently used may now be less relevant. For example, instead of the fear of defection of state
actors, equally worrying is the consequences of inaction, an outcome not accounted for in the
literature above.
Nevertheless, given the current state of the international cooperation academic
literature, we can force ourselves to synthesize the theoretical debates and tie these theories
back to our empirical analysis of maritime piracy cooperation in Asia. Assuming that the
33 (Milner, 1992) p. 480
traditional theories can be directly extrapolated to cooperation against the non-traditional
security threat of maritime piracy, we should expect to observe the following:
1) The fewer the number of actors, the greater the potential for cooperation. This suggests
that if we do witness cooperation in the region, it should comprise of a small number of
bilateral cooperation that result when individual countries take proactive steps to
promote cooperation with their neighbors, rather than multilateral instances of
cooperation that involve a wide variety of nation states.
2) Multilateral institutions that have enforcement power are synonymous with greater
cooperation. Given the weak of non-existent multilateral institutions in Asia, we should
not witness any significant levels of cooperation, especially at the multilateral level.
3) Hegemons can generate cooperation by volunteering to take on the majority of the
security burden. However, given the Southeast Asia's general aversion to security
intervention by external powers, such hegemons will be strongly resisted by the region,
at the expense of potential cooperation against the maritime piracy threat.
40
Chapter 3: Background on Maritime Piracy
Let us begin our focus on maritime piracy - a particular instance of non-traditional
security threat - by providing the necessary background for understanding the problem. I first
describe the extent of the maritime piracy threat in Asia by explaining why international
cooperation is necessary to combat maritime piracy effectively, and exploring the unique
difficulties that exist when encouraging this particular form of cooperation. Finally, as I did in
the previous chapter, I survey the literature for suggestions on the necessary conditions for
enhancing cooperation, except that in this chapter I focus specifically on conditions for
promoting maritime piracy cooperation in Asia. In sum, this chapter hopes to bring the reader
up to speed in understanding the nuances that are involved in combating the piracy threat in
Asia.
3.1 "Pirata Este Hostes Generis"
Referred in the legal literature by this Latin term, which literally means "an enemy of all
mankind", maritime piracy is an international problem that has had a long history. According to
Adam Young, the term pirates found its roots in ancient Roman and Greek concepts, and in
Southeast Asia, piracy has existed since there were people present to document it.34 Within the
anti-piracy community, the piracy definition that is most often adopted is the International
Maritime Bureau's (IMB) version of "an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with
the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the attempt or capability to use force in
34 See (A. J. Young, 2005)
furtherance of the act".35 Put another way, any instance of an actual or attempted robbery in
territorial or international waters constitutes a maritime piracy incident.
Legend Piracy Attacks 2000 2007 . -TLegend irArcOIS 8 Developmeit T enMarch2000 -Source: ESRI Data & Maps 6D g
Created h ArcGIS 8 using ArcMap
Figure 2: World piracy attacks from 2000 to 2007. Each red dot represents a maritime piracy incident. (Source:
Data created using NGAS anti-shipping messages and ArcGIS software, with help from MIT Libraries ArcGIS staff)
With the help of the staff from MIT Libraries' Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
section, I compiled a database of all maritime piracy attacks that were reported to the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency between 1985 and 2007.36 This database consists of all actual
and attempted attacks on commercial ships that were reported to international maritime safety
agencies, and by having control over the source information, I was able to post-process the
data to perform simple comparisons over space and time.
5 There are significant variations in definitions between the two international anti-piracy organizations, the IMB
and the IMO. The definitions differ on whether the location of the attack matters in the piracy classification, as well
as whether the victim ship needs to be boarded by another ship. We have adopted the IMB definition, since this
choice has become accepted practice in the maritime piracy literature. See (Beckman, 2002; Johnson & Valencia,
2005)
36 Anti-Shipping Activity Messages, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, http://www.nga.mil/. Assessed on
Aug 6, 2007. Once again, many thanks to the MIT GIS staff, especially to Lisa Sweeney, for her invaluable help in
compiling the database.
Figure 2 illustrates the scale of the worldwide maritime piracy problem by providing a
pictorial representation of this database. Between 2000 and 2007, at least 2,612 piracy attacks
and attempted attacks were recorded, and as the figure suggests, these attacks occurred in
many regions throughout the world, though they also tended to be concentrated in particular
regions, such as in Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, the data suggests that
any country with direct access to the open sea is at risk to the maritime piracy threat.
In fact, the extent of the global maritime piracy problem could be far worse, given the
widespread recognition amongst the anti-piracy community that significant underreporting of
piracy incidents is taking place. International information-gathering agencies such as the IMB
and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) rely entirely on victims to report an incident
to them, but piracy victims, including the crew and shipping companies, have incentives not to
report an attack. The complicated reporting procedures often result in additional delays to the
ship's schedules, and these delays can cost more than EUR 10,000 a day due both to the extra
days in port and the additional fuel costs. 37 In addition, shipping owners are afraid that these
reports will dent their commercial reputation and increase their insurance premiums, though
they are now required to do so by their insurance companies. IMB estimates that between 40
and 60 percent of all attacks remain unreported.3 8
37 (Johnson & Valencia, 2005) p. xii.
38 Report of the United Nations Atlas of the Oceans, "Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea", New York, 2005.
Maritime piracy poses a potential threat to the global economy because it often takes
place along the major economic sea trade routes, also known as Sea Lanes of Communications
(SLOCs). Not only do these sea lanes provide a constant stream of goods-laden ships that make
it valuable for pirates to risk an attack, but the important shipping nodes of the world, such as
the Malacca Straits and Horn of Africa, also provide calm, sheltered water for pirates to hide
and wait for the next target to pounce on. Furthermore, these crowded harbors cause ships to
anchor for long stretches of time offshore while waiting for their turns to enter the port,
resulting in pirates having additional opportunities to board the ships. 39
3.2 Asia: Piracy Central
One such region with worrying piracy trends is the Malacca Straits and its surrounding
waters in Asia. With more than 40,000 ships passing through every year, the Malacca Straits is
the busiest sea lane in the world, providing the critical link between countries such as China,
Japan and Australia on the East, and India and Europe on the West. 40 Together with the Sunda
and Lombok Straits, the region lies on one of the world's most important oil trade route, and
accounts for more than half of the world's shipping tonnage. In addition, Asia has some of the
largest shipping ports in the world, such as Singapore and Hongkong, making the security of the
waters in the region an issue of international concern.
39 (Johnson & Valencia, 2005) p. xiv
40 (Chaikin, 2005)
Southeast Asia 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cambodia 1 1 1 1
Indonesia 49 10 22 33 57 47 60 115 119 91 103 121
Malacca Straits 7 5 3 2 3 1 2 75 17 16 28
Malaysia 2 4 5 5 4 10 18 21 19 14 5
Myanmar (Burma) 1 2 1 5 3
Philippines 5 5 24 39 16 15 6 9 8 10 12
Singapore Straits 3 2 2 5 1 14 5 7 5 2
Thailand 4 16 17 2 5 8 8 5 2
Far East 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
China/Hongkong/ Macau 1 6 31 9 5 2 2 1
East China Sea 1 10 6 1 1 1 2 1
Hong Kong/ Luzon/Hainan 27 12 7 4 1
Papua New Guinea 1 1 3 1 1
Solomon Islands 1 1 2 2
South China Sea 6 31 6 3 2 6 5 3 9 4 2
Taiwan 2 2 1 1
Vietnam 2 4 4 2 6 8 12 15
Indian Subcontinent 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bangladesh 2 2 4 9 9 25 55 25 32 58
India 5 1 8 11 15 12 14 35 27 18 27
Sri Lanka 2 1 6 9 13 1 6 3 1 2 2
Table 1.Breakdown of maritime piracy attacks by country between 1992-2003. (Source: (Abhyankar, 2006))
Figure 3. Piracy attacks in Asia from 1985 to 2007. (Source: Data created using NGAS anti-shipping messages and
ArcGIS software, with help from MIT Libraries ArcGIS staff)
Over the past two decades, Asia has witnessed a worrying increase in the number of
piracy attacks in the region. Table 1 shows the geographical breakdown of piracy attacks
between 1992 and 2003, while Figure 3 provides a pictorial representation of the location of
these attacks between 1985 and 2007. Together, the two pieces of data highlight the high
incidence of piracy attacks throughout the region. Not only did Indonesia account for more
than 25 percent of all piracy attacks in the world between 2000 and 2006, but nearby waters,
such as the Malacca Straits and the Bangladesh coast, have also witnessed rampant levels of
maritime piracy. In addition, the data conceals a separate trend, whereby pirates are resorting
to greater violence to achieve their aims. Said to contain the world's most organized piracy
criminal network, pirates in Southeast Asia often have links with criminal organizations,
underground markets and corrupt governments, resort to a greater use of guns and knives, and
often engage in the indiscriminate killing of crew members. 41 It is no wonder then that in 2004,
the IMO issued a circular to all ships, warning them to avoid the region if possible, and
especially cautioning against anchoring in the vicinity of ports in the region. 42
There are a number of ways to explain this resurgence of maritime piracy in the region.
Although piracy has long existed in Southeast Asia, Adam Young (A. J. Young, 2005) suggests
that the increase has been due to the technical advancement of the criminals' capabilities,
combined with the rapid but uneven economic development in the region. Acting as a push
factor that forces potential pirates to turn to crime, the region's economic malaise culminated
41 (Johnson & Valencia, 2005)
42 IMO, "Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crew on Preventing and Suppressing Acts
of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships" MSC/Circ. 623/Rev. 3, 29 May 2002
with the 1997 monetary crisis, pushing piracy from the backwaters to the busiest sea lanes in
Southeast Asia. Furthermore, maritime pirates tend to flourish in areas where national
authorities have difficulty exerting authority over their territories, as in the case of the weak
governments of Indonesia and Bangladesh during this period.43 The political turmoil in
Indonesia at the close of the twentieth century, for example, enabled maritime pirates to run
amok throughout Indonesia's territorial waters. It is no wonder then that where such political
situations coincide with important trade routes, maritime piracy tends to thrive.
3.3 The need for cooperation
The growing threat of maritime piracy in Asia has led to greater calls for governments to
take action against the threat. However, for a multitude of reasons, states are finding difficulty
combating the threat alone. The nature of the maritime piracy threat provides the first
explanation. Not only do pirates operate in maritime waters, where territorial boundaries are
not clearly demarcated, but furthermore, these transnational criminals have little regard for
these borders that have been laid out by international laws and treaties, and instead readily
cross into the waters of neighboring states. This is in contrast to the jurisdiction of national law
enforcement agencies, which by international law must stay within the territorial boundaries of
their state. Therefore, even if states are willing and capable of chasing down a pirate, they are
unable to do so if the pirate escapes into the territorial waters of a neighboring country.
Indeed, pirates aware of such a loophole have actively exploited it in order to escape capture.
43 (Chaikin, 2005), p. 126
International cooperation is the only solution for working around this barrier to effectively
combat the threat.
For the purpose of analysis, I classify the countries involved in potential cooperation
against maritime piracy into two groups: coastal and user states. Coastal states refer to those
states that have territorial jurisdiction over the waters where maritime piracy attacks are most
rampant, and in Asia, these refer to the Southeast Asian states with long coastal boundaries,
such as Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. In contrast, user states refer to
countries whose primary interaction with piracy stem from the frequent use of the piracy-
infested waters by merchant ships that fly their national flag, as well as the countries' heavy
dependence on these sea trade routes for their economic growth. Countries such as Japan,
China, and the United States do not have territorial jurisdiction over the maritime boundary in
question, but ships that fly their national flags account for much of the trade in the region. For
instance, Asia's sea lanes provide Japan with more than 80% of its oil supply and channels at
least 60% of Australia's trade." While there is undoubtedly some overlap between the two
definitions, such as in the case of India simultaneously having a piracy-laden coast and also
being a heavy user of the Malacca Straits, this distinction nevertheless helps to distinguish the
contrasting capabilities, constraints and responsibilities of the different state actors in the
region.
44 (Ho, 2006)
Both coastal and user states need to cooperate in order to effectively combat maritime
piracy. First, while coastal states may have the territorial jurisdiction to execute law
enforcement measures against maritime piracy, they often lack the necessary resources to
effectively combat the threat. The majority of piracy incidents take place in waters that are not
considered international waters - between 1999 and 2003, more than 70% of all piracy attacks
occurred either in harbors managed by the coastal states or within their territorial waters.45
This meant that the law enforcement agencies of the coastal states have had to shoulder the
bulk of the anti-piracy burden. Furthermore, as part of the 1982 UNCLOS agreement, the
definition of a nation's territorial waters had been extended from three to twelve miles from
the shoreline; this greatly increased the water surface area that needed to be patrolled by a
weak, or sometimes non-existent, maritime law enforcement agency. The coastal state of
Indonesia exemplifies this problem. Made up of more than 17,000 islands, Indonesia has more
than three million square kilometers of territorial waters to patrol as a result of the 1982
agreement. According to Hasjim Djalal (Djalal, 2005), p. 145), Indonesia thus needs at least
three hundred patrol vessels just to have any chance of patrolling its shores, but as of 2005, it
only had twenty-five ships that could operate at sea at any one time.
In contrast, user states, by their very nature, have the necessary economic resources, as
well as the law enforcement expertise, to help coastal states combat the piracy threat
effectively. Their disproportionate share of the trade passing through the international
waterways reflects their economic capability to provide the necessary law enforcement
45 Numbers obtained from Table I.1 in (Johnson & Valencia, 2005), p. xv.
resources that the coastal states so desperately need. For instance, in the four decades up to
2006, Japan offered more than $130 million in aid money to the coastal states surrounding the
Malacca Straits, assisting them in a plethora of maritime activities.46 Had the user states' law
enforcement agencies not been constrained by the limitations on their jurisdiction in external
territorial waters, these extra-regional powers could probably have combated the problem
unilaterally. Indeed, this was perhaps one of the motivations for the series of escort operations
proposed by the Indian and US navies in the Straits of Malacca from 2001-2002, though the
escorts had to be subsequently abandoned due to opposition from the coastal states. 47 This
opposition has led Greg Chaikin to suggest that even a hegemon "may find small
unconventional threats in a maritime context impossible to defeat without international
cooperation".4 8 Nevertheless, user states can still provide the necessary law enforcement
expertise to their coastal state counterparts, if both sides work hand-in-hand to combat the
maritime piracy threat together.
3.4 Why Cooperation has been Difficult
3.4.1 Political Apathy towards Piracy
Despite the clear necessity for international cooperation, however, trying to promote
cooperation against maritime piracy has been challenging. Piracy experts lament that for a
multitude of reasons, it has been an uphill task to get countries to cooperate. First, national
governments are often politically apathetic to the piracy threat, and as J. N. Mak (Mak, 2006),
46 (Baziron, 2007)
47 (Bradford, 2005)
48 (Chaikin, 2005)
p. 157) suggests, this hinders cooperation because cooperation is often dependent on a state's
hierarchy of interests and its capacity to participate in such efforts. Indonesia, for example, has
had other urgent priorities to respond to on land, including the separatist movements that have
arisen on certain islands, inter-religious strife, as well as the economic malaise resulting from
the 1997 financial crisis. States that do not have an abundance of law enforcement resources
tend to place piracy low on the priority list, since the immediate threats from piracy - the
potential financial loss of a few merchant ships - appear much less significant than some of its
other security concerns.
This political apathy towards piracy has been compounded by the enlargement of
maritime territorial boundaries, put into force through the 1982 UNCLOS agreement. While this
has extended the territorial boundaries of the coastal states, the expansion simultaneously
increased the burdens on the national law enforcement agencies, stretching many of them
beyond their capabilities. Maritime law enforcement agencies have a wide range of threats to
deal with on a daily basis; Malaysia, for instance, views piracy as only one out of the plethora of
maritime problems, such as "illegal migrants, fish poachers, drug smugglers and potential
terrorists", which its maritime agencies have to deal with. 49 Their small fleet of maritime
vessels is therefore inadequate for countering all these threats simultaneously. It is no wonder
then that piracy analysts lament that piracy is a "relatively neglected concern by regional
governments, compared with other threats such as terrorism".50
49 (Mak, 2006), p. 157
50 (G. Ong, 2005), p. 53
This apathy can be similarly extended to the global perception of piracy. As Graham
Gerard Ong suggests, "people around the world simply do not recognize that piracy really exists
as a modern menace".51 Despite the continued occurrence of maritime piracy, such as the
much-publicized hijack of a French yacht by Somalia pirates in 2008, the general public
presumes that maritime piracy is a thing of the past, a phenomenon more associated with
children folk tales than international politics. This has led Greg Chaikin to observe that we do
not witness more cooperation against maritime piracy because such issues play a "minor,
supporting role in international order matters". 52
3.4.2 Cooperating with the Enemy
Another reason for the difficulty in developing international cooperation against
maritime piracy is the accusation that some law enforcement officials are actually involved in
the piracy attacks themselves. ss Rather than attempting to curb the piracy problem, some
officials, such as those from the Indonesian and Chinese law enforcement agencies, are instead
alleged to have been actively participating and profiteering from these activities, either through
the supply of information pertaining to potential ship targets, or by providing a safe and secure
market for the pirates to sell their stolen goods.54 Some reports have even suggested that some
of the attacks were carried out by personnel donning Chinese Navy uniforms, while riding
onboard ships that bore resemblance to Chinese Navy ships. 5 If such acts of defection had
51 Ibid.
52 (Chaikin, 2005)
53 (Dillon, 2000)
54 (Worrall, 2000).
55 (Dillon, 2000)
indeed been occurring, any form of international cooperation with these implicated countries
would have undoubtedly been meaningless.
3.4.3. Sovereignty Sensitivities
However, by far the biggest inhibitor of cooperation in Asia has been the much
referenced "sovereignty sensitivities" held by some of the coastal states. Criticized by piracy
analysts and policymakers alike for "jealously guarding their sovereignty over territorial
waters", coastal states have often been alleged to refrain from any form of cooperation that
even remotely hints at compromising some aspect of state sovereignty.5 6 Indeed, Bradford
(Bradford, 2005) observes that this strong aversion by the coastal states not only completely
eliminates the likelihood of any cooperative ventures that could even remotely raise the
sovereignty sensitivities of the coastal states, but that it may also undermine cooperation
initiatives that do not direct infringe on such sensitivities, in case these initiatives lead to
"creeping infringement".
It is worth understanding the roots of this criticism, and I suggest three explanations for
this view. First, the region's recent freedom from its history of colonization continues to weigh
on the minds of national leaders. Given that most countries in the region were only granted
independence from their colonial masters after World War II, it is perhaps not surprising that
some countries still fear that their new found freedom will be challenged by other states. For
example, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 to
bring together five of these newly independent states, a "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation"
56 (G. Ong, 2005), p. 53
agreement was signed to emphasize the respect of each nation's territorial sensitivity. This
treaty has since been extended to all subsequent ASEAN new members, as well as many of
ASEAN's key regional partners.5 7
Coupled with this new freedom has been the fact that many of these coastal states are
still trying to define their maritime boundaries, and many remain in territorial disputes with
each other. Malaysia, for instance, still has maritime boundaries that have not been universally
recognized nor internationally accepted.58 Many islands in the South China Sea continue to be
hotly contested amongst states in the region, not only because some states regard this issue as
a source of national pride, but also because they lead to an extension of the 200nm Exclusive
Economic Zone, within which countries have the right to extract economic resources from the
waters. For example, Singapore and Malaysia are still awaiting a decision by the International
Court of Justice on who owns the sovereignty rights to the island of Petra Branca, while the
Spratly Islands, which is surrounded by rich fishing grounds and potential oil deposits, remain
hotly contested by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines and even Brunei. These
continued disputes make maritime territorial sensitivity a deeply contentious issue, for the
presence of naval vessels and other flag ships by a neighboring country can be easily
interpreted as a sign of that country exerting territorial claim over the disputed area. It is no
wonder then that Mak suggests that any changes in the authority and management of the
Malacca Straits would similarly have implications beyond the Straits alone.59
(ASEAN, 2005)
58 (Mak, 2006), p. 156
59 (Mak, 2006)
Finally, a tit-for-tat explanation suggests that these "sensitivities" are the coastal states'
response to a tussle between the coastal and user states in the maritime domain that has
waged for decades. In the three decades since the 1960s, coastal and user states battled over
whether the Malacca Straits was an international strait where all ships had "innocent passage",
or if the straits was instead part of the territorial waters that belonged to the coastal states,
and user states were merely granted "transit passage". 60 While this dispute was somewhat
resolved with the 1982 UNCLOS agreement, the tussle continued in the 90s, when Indonesia
and Malaysia pushed for a stricter ship safety regime after facing a threat of oil spills by foreign
tankers. 61 However, this regime was refused by the user states such as the United States and
Japan, and thus the "sovereignty sensitivities" that persist today may reflect a similar retaliation
by the coastal states' to the user states.
As an aside, I should qualify that these sovereignty sensitivities are not unique to
international cooperation efforts between coastal and user states. Indeed, the issue of
sovereignty sensitivities has been a limiting factor even for intra-ASEAN cooperation, including
those purely amongst the coastal states. For example, the 2004 MALSINDO coordinated patrols
between the Malaysian, Singaporean and Indonesian navies does not grant navies the right of
"hot pursuit", and instead confines the ships to their own waters to "respect the cardinal
60 (Mak, 2006), p. 144
61 (Johnson & Valencia, 2005)
principal of national sovereignty". 6 2 Sovereignty sensitivities have therefore reared its head in
many attempts at promoting international cooperation.
Furthermore, the sensitivities are not homogenous amongst all coastal states.
Singapore, for instance, has openly welcomed the active involvement of user states in helping
to secure the straits against piracy and terrorism, a strategic posture that is often referred to as
the "internationalization" of the straits.63  One explanation for this is that Singapore's
geographical disadvantage at being locked in by the maritime zones of its neighbors makes the
question of maritime sovereignty infringement by user states irrelevant.64 Nevertheless, even
Singapore has begun advocating to the user states that they have to take into account such
sovereignty sensitivities when discussing international cooperation. In 2004, Singapore's
Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Tony Tan emphasized that "all of these efforts must take into
account the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral [coastal] states". s It is therefore
not much of a stretch to suggest that sovereignty sensitivities remain an important
consideration when discussing international cooperation.
3.5 Conditions for Greater Cooperation: From the Anti-Piracy Perspective
Despite the difficulties for international cooperation in Asia, the piracy threat persists
and needs to be dealt with. In this final section of the chapter, I survey the literature for
suggestions on how to promote greater cooperation against piracy in Asia. In particular, I seek
62 Statement made by Malaysia Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak. Marcus Hand, "Malaysia and Indonesia Retract
Joint Patrol Statement", Lloyd's List, (July 2, 2004)
63 (Johnson & Valencia, 2005)
64 (Mak, 2006), p. 138
65 The Hindu, "India to be sounded on Malacca Straits Security", Singapore, 29 Aug 2004.
to highlight the debates that have been waged in the literature in pursuit of a solution to the
problem.
3.5.1 Coupling piracy and terrorism
One possible solution that has been suggested by some piracy analysts is to emphasize
that piracy attacks can actually be covers for terrorist acts, a strategy that has been termed the
"conflation of piracy and terrorism" in Southeast Asia. Although their ends may differ drastically
- piracy is motivated by greed and focuses on financial gain, whereas terrorism is motivated by
political goals that go beyond the immediate hijacking operation; nevertheless, piracy and
terrorism are both maritime-based crimes, and the means that are employed are often
surprisingly similar.66 For example, both acts first involve the forceful takeover of a merchant
ship. Indeed, Singapore's Home Minister Wong Kan Seng noted that "sometimes we do not
know whether it's pirates or terrorists who occupy the ship, so we have to treat them all
alike".67
The similarities that exist between the two security threats have led to calls for coupling
terrorism together with piracy. Piracy experts such as Graham Gerard Ong (G. Ong, 2005)
suggest that highlighting the possibilities for piracy incidents to become acts of maritime
terrorism will increase the attention of coastal states to the increased consequences of inaction
towards the piracy threat, thereby increasing the prioritization of maritime security and
goading states into action. He suggests that conflating the two issues will increase the
66 (G. Ong, 2005)
67 "Pirates should be regarded as terrorists: Kan Seng", Business Times: Shipping Times, 22 December 2003, p. 1
likelihood of cooperation not only because of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States,
but also because of terrorist attempts that are much closer to the region, such as the 2002 Bali
bombing in Indonesia, as well as the uncovering of a terrorist plot to fly a plane into Singapore's
Changi Airport. Indeed, Ong suggests that the "current threat of terrorism has sharpened
attention on other international crimes such as piracy", and argues that a successful linkage of
the two issues in the minds of policymakers will generate the necessary impetus for action.68
Furthermore, he suggests that the conflation of piracy with terrorism will make coastal states
more willing to accept external assistance, since they then become aware of the magnitude of
the problem that needs to be combated and recognize that they will not be able to tackle the
threat unilaterally.
However, this conflation of piracy and terrorism has its critics. Although it could compel
greater cooperation, the conflation of the piracy threat with terrorism could similarly backfire,
and instead be interpreted as an effort by extra-regional powers to implement a broader
security plan that goes well beyond the fight against piracy and terrorism in the straits. Because
of the often greater scale and scope of terrorist threats compared to maritime piracy, any
international cooperation against terrorism must inherently involve military forces, which
further incites the sovereignty fears of coastal states. It is no wonder then that Mark Valencia
(Valencia, 2005) suggests that the different perspectives on "terrorism" and sovereignty may in
fact undermine cooperation, and that the two problems require different long term solutions.6 9
In a similar vein, I argue in Chapter 6 that an effective means of promoting anti-piracy
68 (G. Ong, 2005)
69 (Valencia, 2005)
cooperation is through the enhancement of non-militarized forms of cooperation, leveraging on
the unique characteristics of the non-traditional threat nature of the maritime piracy problem.
3.5.2 Joint patrol vs. Help with training
A second area of debate concerns the types of cooperation that should be encouraged
amongst states in order to promote effective international cooperation. On the one hand, some
scholars place emphasis on promoting joint patrols and exercises, whereby law enforcement
agencies of different countries cooperate by having their anti-piracy personnel interact with
each other, learning and practicing counter-piracy techniques together. These activities are
much prized because it indicates a high level of "operationalization", a term Bradford coins to
indicate the extent to which the cooperation can be carried out by middle rank officials without
direct coordination at the strategic level. 70 Furthermore, such cooperation creates a significant
show of force against the pirates, and a number of scholars have suggested that the combined
patrols by law enforcement agencies have proved effective in Southeast Asia.71
Coming from a different angle, Adam Young argues that although joint cooperation is
ultimately necessary to address the piracy problem, the first priority must be to re-establish the
domestic security regimes and capabilities of the coastal states, addressing the problem at its
roots by providing funding and training to develop national operational security capabilities.72
Similarly, Mak (Mak, 2006), p. 151-159) contends that the focus must first be on a political
settlement to convince littoral states such as Malaysia and Indonesia that their maritime
70 (Bradford, 2005)
71 See (Bradford, 2005),(Ho, 2006)
72(A. J. Young, 2007), p. 116
boundaries are sacrosanct. These suggest that joint patrols and exercises are merely superficial
displays of cooperation, and the push for such activities may backfire because the coastal states
already fear such direct involvement from extra-regional powers. Similarly, Mark Valencia
(Valencia, 2005) suggests that joint exercises and patrols that involve user states, such as the
US-India naval patrols, may face practical issues of whether these external powers do possess
the arrest authority if the situation arises.73 Instead, other forms of cooperation are suggested,
including the provision of international funds, training and materials to develop national coast
guards and local patrol capabilities, as well as developing the region economically and politically
in the long run. 74 Hasjim Djalal (Djalal, 2005), p. 158) further suggests reaching agreements on
maritime boundary delimitation so as to clarify the area of operation for law enforcement
agencies, as well as to promote formal and informal forums for greater regional understanding.
This debate suggests that there is an inherent tradeoff between the level of
operationalization of a particular type of cooperation and the likelihood of the cooperation
actually materailizing. If we hold all other factors constant, there appears to be a higher
probability of cooperation if we focus on promoting non-operational forms of cooperation,
such as providing large sums of aid and law enforcement training to the coastal states.
Unfortunately, this has a less direct effect on curbing maritime piracy. Ultimately, the question
is therefore whether operationalized forms of cooperation can be promoted in a more
successful manner.
73 (Valencia, 2005). This may refer more to US-India naval patrols than international cooperation that involves
coastal states, and hence may be taken out of context here.
74 (A. J. Young, 2005), p. 26.
3.5.3 Bilateral vs. Multilateral
The final issue builds off the game theoretic hypothesis that were earlier identified in
Chapter 2, where I discussed what the optimal number of actors for promoting cooperation is.
In the maritime piracy literature, this debate has manifested itself through the question of
whether regional institutions and forums, such as ASEAN and ARF, have any role to play in
enhancing cooperation, or if cooperation efforts should instead focus on promoting bilateral
cooperation amongst individual countries.
In the interest of avoiding a repetition, I defer the detailed discussion of this material to
Chapter 5, where I analyze the arguments made by both the proponents and critics of ASEAN's
role in promoting cooperation against maritime piracy, as well as the suggestion by some to
rely solely on bilateral and trilateral forms of cooperation to eradicate maritime piracy.
3.6 Summary
International cooperation against maritime piracy in Asia is undoubtedly a challenging
task, one that is fraught with many difficulties. The solutions that have been proposed by piracy
analysts have not been without their skeptics, and in the subsequent chapters, I take on each of
the debates in one form or another. Based on the empirical data that I have collected, I argue
for alternative explanations to explain how cooperation has managed to materialize in Asia.
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Chapter 4: Looking at the Numbers
Methodology and Data Collection
Having discussed the relevant background for understanding the difficulty of promoting
international cooperation against maritime piracy in Asia, I now tackle the underlying question
in this thesis - What is the state of international cooperation against maritime piracy in Asia?
Indeed, the answer to this question underpins the validity of the rest of this thesis, because by
attempting to provide explanations for the disproportionately high levels of international
cooperation in the region, I have implicitly assumed that such cooperation does exist to a
significant extent.
Unfortunately, in attempting to determine the level of international cooperation in Asia,
I found that no solution was readily available. Not only is the literature on maritime piracy
somewhat conflicting in its assessments and analyses, but in addition, no database of
international cooperation against maritime piracy, or any transnational threat for that matter,
is publicly available. In light of this, I decided to take matters into my own hands, and compiled
my own maritime piracy international cooperation database, using newspaper reports over the
past two decades to document and collate all reported instances of cooperation by any two or
more countries worldwide. Using this database as the empirical backbone for the rest of the
analysis in this thesis, I not only observe that there has been a significant level of international
cooperation in Asia, but also contend that the high levels of international cooperation in this
region over the past decade cannot simply be explained by the high incidence of piracy attacks
in the region over the same period. Comparing general cooperation trends across different
regions, I conclude that other factors, which I propose in Chapters 5 and 6, must be at work for
generating the levels of cooperation we have witnessed in Asia.
The roadmap for this chapter is as follows: I first provide a brief synthesis of the
conclusions drawn by different piracy analysts on the state of international cooperation in Asia,
noting how a consensus has thus far been elusive. This underscores the necessity for creating
our own piracy cooperation database, and I thus describe the methodology that I have
employed, as well as the inherent limitations of this preliminary data collection. I then present
our collated dataset and provide a summary of the data; here, I have sought to make this
database openly available so that it can be extended and used for subsequent research on
cooperation against maritime piracy. Finally, by comparing the state of international
cooperation across different regions, I draw conclusions of the unique characteristics of
maritime piracy cooperation in Asia, especially in the Southeast Asian region.
4.1 What the Experts Say
I begin by revisiting the literature on maritime piracy cooperation to understand what
piracy analysts have observed about the state of cooperation in Asia. We quickly realize that
despite the fact that many of the articles were written during the same period, with some even
published together in the same volume, there is significant diversity and even contradictions in
the opinions that have been expressed. 7s At one end, some analysts have witnessed a sharp
increase in cooperation amongst Asian nations in the past decade, and are thus optimistic
about the state of cooperation in the region. John Bradford (Bradford, 2005), for example,
suggests that nation states have not only reinvigorated their cooperation commitments, but
have also created new ones, thereby demonstrating their significant commitment to expanding
maritime confidence and security building measures (MCSBMs) and other forms of
operationalized cooperation. By proposing that five factors have enabled greater international
cooperation - relaxing sovereignty sensitivities, alignment of extra-regional power interests,
increasing prevalence of cooperation norms, improving state resource capabilities and
increasing prioritization of maritime security, Bradford argues that even though obstacles
remain, states nevertheless appear firmly committed to international cooperation.
At the other end, Graham Gerard Ong (G. Ong, 2005), analyzing the same region over
the same period, argues that there have been insufficient cooperation efforts amongst
Southeast Asian governments because of "inertia, complacency, and the complexities of
national pride and rivalry". Contending that anti-piracy cooperation has been mediocre at best,
he therefore argues for the coupling of the piracy and terrorism threats in the public policy
discourse, so as to significantly increase the attention of national governments to this
worsening problem.
75 Many of the most important articles on maritime piracy cooperation can be found in two books, Derek Johnson
and Mark Valencia, ed. Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues and Responses and Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, ed.
Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits. See (Johnson & Valencia, 2005; G. G. Ong, 2006)
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Turning to particular instances of cooperation, analysts similarly differ on the
conclusions that should be drawn from some of the more noteworthy instances of cooperation
in Asia. With reference to the joint patrols amongst the coastal states of Malaysia, Singapore
and Indonesia, also known as the MALSINDO patrols, Adam Young optimistically suggests that
this instance of cooperation reveals that "Indonesia and Malaysia are willing to share
responsibility of security in this region". 76 In contrast, J.N. Mak argues that the joint initiative
has merely been a Malaysia-Indonesia "public relations exercise", agreed upon only for the
countries to appear that they are taking some action against the problem, thereby avoiding
military intervention in the Malacca Straits.77 By implication, Mak suggests that the presence of
cooperation does not automatically imply that meaningful cooperation is actually taking place.
If we analyze the literature further, one possible cause for the disagreements amongst
piracy analysts is the differing opinions of the effectiveness of the cooperation that have
developed thus far. Because the metric of cooperation effectiveness is inherently arbitrary,
analysts have unsurprisingly disagreed over this issue. Mark Valencia (Valencia, 2005), for
example, suggests that despite the presence of maritime cooperation amongst Asian countries,
their effectiveness has been questioned because some of the cooperation appears merely to be
"talk shops" that hardly lead to any action. Joshua Ho (Ho, 2006) similarly argues that existing
countermeasures in Asia have had limited effectiveness due to the sovereignty concerns,
differences in capabilities, and political suspicions that continue to exist today. In contrast,
other analysts have pointed to other indicators to support their optimism about the effects of
76 (A. J. Young, 2007), p. 116
77 (Mak, 2006), p. 156
the cooperation efforts thus far. P. Mukundan, for instance, points to the recovery of vessels
such as the Siam Xanxai, Petro Ranger, Global Mars, Alondra Rainbow, Selayang, Inabukwa, as
evidence that such cooperation have had some effect, and suggests that states have shown a
much greater willingness to discuss issues and cooperation on a regional scale to address the
problem.78
Focusing on particular characteristics of international cooperation, scholars have
similarly disagreed on the particular avenues of cooperation in Asia. Sandra Levitt (Leavitt,
2005), for example, assumes the lack of security cooperation between Japan and ASEAN in her
analysis of the underlying explanations for this apparent trend.79 She suggests that despite the
commonality of threats between the two actors, such as piracy, terrorism and smuggling,
security cooperation in the past decade between Japan and ASEAN has trailed both intra-
ASEAN cooperation and cooperation between ASEAN and the Western powers.80 In contrast,
John Bradford contends that Japan has taken a leading role in eradicating maritime piracy in the
region, and has enjoyed success in promoting bilateral cooperation with ASEAN states.8 1
Similarly, Greg Chaikin (Chaikin, 2005) p. 138) argues that Japan's anti-piracy initiatives have
achieved success, and thus Japan's contributions to promoting international cooperation must
not be underestimated.
78(Mukundan, 2005), p. 39
79 (Leavitt, 2005)
80 Ibid, p. 218
81 (Bradford, 2004)
This brief review therefore suggests that despite the maritime piracy analyst community
being a relatively small one, a consensus has not been reached about the state of international
cooperation in the region, not only in terms of the intensity of cooperation in Asia, but also the
effectiveness of the cooperation and the main channels via which cooperation develops. We
therefore cannot simply rely on a literature review to determine the state of cooperation
against maritime piracy in Asia.
4.2 Towards an Anti-Piracy Cooperation Database
In light of the contrasting viewpoints, I had hoped to directly refer to some list of the
cooperation instances to make our own assessment of the state of maritime piracy cooperation
in Asia. Unfortunately, such a record of all piracy cooperation did not exist. Few publicly
available databases actually keep track of any form of international cooperation amongst
nation states, and none of these provide any information on maritime piracy cooperation. The
closest database is the United Nations Treaty Collection, but this collection only contains those
agreements that were registered with the United Nations, leaving out many important data-
points. Other similar datasets include Joshua S. Goldstein's database on International
Cooperation and Regional Conflicts, as well the Correlates of War Formal Alliance dataset,
although both are primarily concerned with traditional security threats. 82
Given the lack of an existing database that documents maritime piracy cooperation, I
decided to create my own dataset with the desired information on international cooperation
82 For Correlates of War dataset, see (Gibler, 2004). For Int'l Cooperation and Regional Conflicts dataset, see
(Goldstein, 2004).
against piracy. In addition, we believe that this will address one possible cause for the
contradictory opinions amongst piracy analysts, since the absence of such a cooperation
dataset makes it difficult for opposing camps to even agree upon the facts before having the
opportunity to identify their areas of disagreement.
4.3 Methodology
To compile this preliminary version of the cooperation database, I performed a search
for instances of cooperation that were reported in newspaper articles over the past two
decades, starting from 1990 and ending in December 2007. Using the Dow Jones Factiva
database, which includes the record of all "Dow Jones newswires", "major news and business
publications", "press release wires", and "Reuters newswires", I searched for any newspaper
article that contained the terms "maritime" and "piracy", along with one or more of the
following terms: "cooperation", "cooperate", or "agreement".8 3 By doing so, I have not
restricted ourselves to just cooperation within Asia, thus enabling us to make general
comparisons across different regions. This search returned more than 1700 news articles, from
which I extracted the relevant cooperation information and compiled it into our piracy
cooperation dataset.
The database sought to document all instances of cooperation involving government
officials from at least two different countries. Recall from Chapter 1 that the definition of
cooperation involves, at the minimum, that actors have actively adjusted their actions and
83 This was selected by choosing "sources" under search preferences and selecting the "All sources/top sources"
category
behaviors to align their preferences with others. Unfortunately, there is a large variety of
interactions that countries can engage in, and hence it was often difficult for us to ascertain
whether the actors have had to sufficiently adjust their actions in the interaction, so as to be
considered as a form of cooperation. In the interest of making our database as inclusive as
possible, I have set the threshold as any form of interaction between government officials of at
least two different nation states, where the officials either engaged in an operational activity,
such as a joint operation or training, or mutually agreed upon a decision to take action against
maritime piracy. In all of these cases, the threat of maritime piracy must be an explicit
motivation for the cooperation.
I have sought to create a dataset that not only sheds light on the state of maritime
piracy cooperation globally, but also one that can be used for future research by others in the
community. As such, I have only reported that an instance of cooperation has occurred when
the particular activity has actually been reflected in the media. Here, I note that the lack of
confirmation of an agreement's operationalization does not imply that it did not actually occur,
but could instead have been merely due to the fact that I have avoided extrapolating instances
of cooperation from other sources of data. For example, even though annual joint patrols have
occurred between Malaysia and Indonesia since 1992, I only record the eighth annual patrol in
1999, since prior joint patrols after 1992 were not reported in the media. Nevertheless,
because we seek to provide as complete a picture of the state of cooperation against maritime
piracy as possible, as well as to record whenever cooperation agreements have actually
materialized, I have included all instances of cooperation whenever they were reported in the
media, even if this may somewhat compromise the statistical accuracy of the data. However,
when I subsequently post-process our data, I account for this by noting the number of
independent instances of cooperation that have been recorded.
Finally, it may help the reader to better appreciate the scope of this dataset by detailing
which forms of interaction have been intentionally left out of the dataset. I do not include calls
by the leaders of a single country calling for more cooperation, nor do I include calls for help by
individual countries unless another country responds and agrees to help. In addition, I have
decided against coding the unilateral actions taken by individual countries, even if these are
initiatives that would facilitate cooperation in future. Thus, I do not include Japan's revision of
its Coast Guard Law to make it legal for Japan to send its coast guard to help with maritime
piracy cooperation further from its shores, or Malaysia's efforts at setting up the Malaysia
Maritime Enforcement Agency to facilitate cooperation with law enforcement agencies of other
nations. Finally, I have also decided to leave out agreements that were made at the sub-
national level, such as those by members of the shipping industry and the trade unions, since
these acts of cooperation do not involve the same sorts of tradeoffs that government officials
have to consider when deciding whether to cooperate.
4.4 Cooperation against Maritime Piracy, 1990-2007
Table 2 present the dataset that has been collated. I have tried to sort the cooperation
into four geographical regions, in line with IMO's categorization when reporting the incidence
of piracy attacks - Malacca Straits (MS), South China Sea (SCS), Indian Ocean (10), and Africa.
This will enable us to subsequently compare the maritime piracy cooperation across the
different regions, as I seek to determine if there is a direct correlation between the number of
piracy attacks and the number of instances of cooperation. Here, our categorization of the
cooperation was made by considering the region that the cooperation efforts were targeted at.
For instance, most of the agreements that India and the United States have concluded with
coastal states such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have been coded as cooperation in
the Malacca Straits, since these countries have primarily focused on working together to fight
the scourge of piracy in the territorial waters of the coastal states, rather than those in the
waters of the bigger countries such as the Indian Ocean. However, due to the close proximity of
some of these regions, I have also witnessed additional cooperation that have spanned multiple
piracy-prone regions, and have thus coded them as such.
Jan 91 MS Indonesia, Malaysia General Border Agreement, organizes joint patrol operations 4 times a year JA
Oct 91 SCS China, Taiwan Taiwan delegation visitingChina reach consensus on fighting piracy together GA
Apr 92 MS International 24-hour Piracy Reporting Center (IMB PRC) set up to collect information and intelligence on pirate attacks IA
Maritime Bureau and disseminate to shipowners, law enforcement agencies. Opens in Oct 1992
Jun 92 MS Singapore, Indonesia Agree to joint naval patrols, with a direct communication link to improve coordination. Navies and marine JA
police will have right of hot pursuit. Patrols commenced in August 1992.
Jul 92 SCS ASEAN, China, Russia Countries agree on Spratly Declaration, and also commit to explore area of cooperation such as anti-piracy GA
projects
Oct 92 MS Japan, Malaysia Malaysia and Japan explore opportunities for Japan to support in securing the safety of the Malacca Straits, GA
after Malaysia's requests
Apr 93 SCS China, Taiwan Both countries agree to set up formal channel for negotiation on economic and social issues, including GA
cooperation to combat maritime piracy
Aug 94 MS, SCS Malaysia, Philippines KL-Manita defense pact signed between both countries to enhance military cooperation, helping both GA
countries t to ackle piracy and other security matters.
Aug 95 SCS China, Philippines Both countriesagree on code of conduct for settling South China Sea disputes amicably, and to promote GA
cooperation in areas such as prevention of piracy eventually
Mar 96 SCS China, Philippines Joint statement issued, both countries agreed to cooperate in combating piracy in South China Sea, GA
establishing working groups and exchange visits. Part of annual talks between both countries
Dec 97 MS, SCS ASEAN ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime agreed to convene experts group to study feasibility of ASEAN GA
Plan of Action on Transnational Crime and ASEAN Center on Transnational Crime
Mar 98 SCS Thailand, Vietnam Joint-commission meeting in Thailand agreed to intensify cooperation in fight against piracy, amongst other GA
talks like energy cooperation and trade
Jul 98 SCS Thailand, Cambodia Border meeting between both navy chiefs agreed to begin joint operation to patrol common territorial JA
waters, tackling both drug trafficking and piracy more efficiently
Sep 98 MS IMO, Thailand, IMO sends expert anti-piracy mission to 3 countries, working together with local representatives to identify
Malaysia, Indonesia problems, create profile of pirates, and trying to link solutions with existing law enforcement measures
Feb 99 MS, SCS South Korea, Navies agreed to seek cooperation to tackle piracy, will discuss holding further combined naval maneuver GA
Indonesia exercises against pirates, and will discuss ways to further strengthen military exchanges
May 99 Panama United States, Panama United States delivers 2 patrol ships to Panama to help fight drugs and piracy EA
Jun 99 SCS Thailand, Vietnam Navy forces sign pact to start joint patrol along border, implementing schemes to boost mutual JA
understanding and cooperation in sea rescues and piracy
Jun 99 MS, SCS ASEAN Governments agreed in principle to set up ASEAN Center for combating transnational crime and adopted IA
ASEAN plan of action to combat transnational crime
Jul 99 MS Malaysia, Indonesia 8 joint patrol conducted in Straits since Dec 2, 1992, involving 7 ships and 2 aircraft from both countries, re- JC
emphasizing cooperation by both sides to ensure safety of straits
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Nov 99 SCS, MS ASEAN, Japan Japan submits proposal to ASEAN to set up a joint regional coast guard body, promote the exchange of IA
information against maritime piracy, and provide financial assistance. Patrol plan gets positive response
Feb 00 Asia India, Japan Visit by India's defense minister to Japan forge agreement to encourage maritime cooperation, especially on GA
growing piracy in Southeast Asian waters
Mar 00 MS, SCS 13 Asian countries Regional coast guard conference organized by Japan Maritime Safety Agency in Singapore agree to work GA
together to fight against piracy, and to hold higher level talks in April
Mar 00 10 India, Vietnam Agreement signed between defense ministers for Indian Coast Guards and Vietnamese sea-police to GA
cooperate with each other in combating piracy
Apr 00 SCS Malaysia, Philippines Recent bilateral talks between Malaysia and the Philippines have focused on promoting border patrol JA
cooperation to stem piracy
Apr 00 MS, SCS 16 Asian countries Maritime policy officials adopted "Asia Anti-piracy challenges 2000" and "Mode action plan" agreements at GA
regional conference, pledging to work together to combat piracy in the region.
Jul 00 MS FPDA countries Agreed to have joint exercises amongst the 5 countries to fight anti-piracy, as well as for closer cooperation JA
amongst the countries to stamp out the problem.
Aug 00 Asia India, Japan Japan PM visit to India, agreed to institutionalize dialogue between for defense and foreign affairs ministers JA
to coordinate actions on security of sea-lanes and joint naval exercises to combat piracy
Oct 00 MS, SCS Japan, ASEAN Japan agrees to help crack down on piracy by providing assistance in the education of antipiracy personnel, TA
holding seminar for 10 ASEAN coast guard officials and enroll 5 students in its maritime technical college
Nov 00 Asia India, Japan Japan Coast Guard visits India and holds first ever joint exercise-drill overseas, involving 3 ships and 3 JC
aircrafts. Discussions held between Coast guard chiefs, agreeing on annual exercises between coast guards
Nov 00 MS, SCS ASEAN Regional experts meeting on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships, first of four annual experts
meetings, seeks closer cooperation amongst countries to combat piracy in Asian waters
Nov 00 MS Japan, Malaysia Joint exercise drill held off Malaysia's coast between Japan coast guard and Malaysian maritime police. JC
Nov 00 MS Japan, Malaysia, Malaysia and Indonesia rejects Japan's offer for joint anti-piracy patrols, though they still request Japan's
Indonesia help in technology and information exchange
Dec 00 MS South Korea, Defense ministers of both sides meet and agree to further cooperation to assist in dealing with maritime GA
Indonesia accidents and disasters such as piracy. First talks between defense ministers of two countries in ten years
Dec 00 North Canada, China, Russia, First meeting of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, a meeting of coast guard heads to discuss how to crack
Asia Japan, South Korea, down on piracy and smuggling of drugs and guns in northwestern pacific
US
Jan 01 MS Japan, Singapore Delegates from both sides agree to work together to provide regional security for piracy that Malaysia and GA
Indonesia had rejected
Jan 01 MS Indonesia, India Both countries sign cooperation agreement for weapons purchases and joint training exercises on piracy, JA
though both sides stress that this does not amount to a defense pact.
Feb 01 MS Singapore, Indonesia Memorandum of Understanding signed to improve education and training of seafarers to combat piracy, in TA
addition to allowing Indonesian sailors to get jobs on Singapore-registered ships
Mar 01 MS, SCS 11 Asian countries, 2 day meeting in Singapore amongst Asian government officials, initiated by IMO, agreed for IMO to consult GA
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IMO governments to work towards regional agreement on cooperation against maritime piracy, armed robbery
Mar 01 MS South Korea, South Korea agrees with each country separately for cooperation with respective navies to counter piracy GA
Malaysia, Singapore problem, agreeing to promote exchange and cooperation in defense industry and logistics.
Apr 01 MS, SCS Japan, ASEAN 5 employees of ASEAN Coast guards enroll in Japan Coast Guard Academy for training, studying navigation
and communication for between two and five years
May 01 Asia Japan, Russia, India Japan Coast Guard holds annual sea review and drill in Tokyo Bay, holds joint exercise with India Coast Guard JC
and Russian Federal Border Service
Jun 01 MS Indonesia, Malaysia, Pirates successfully caught after Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore pooled their efforts, along with
Singapore, IMB information from the IMB PRC, to recapture the vessel.
Jul 01 MS Japan, Singapore, Bilateral Joint drills conducted between Japan Coast Guard and counterparts in Singapore and Brunei. Japan JC
Brunei patrol boat sent 4 times between Jul 2001 and Mar 2002.
Aug 01 10 US, India US lifts sanctions off India so as to accelerate cooperation in joint exercises, officer exchanges and
coordinated efforts to combat piracy. And protect sea lanes of Indian Ocean
Aug 01 SCS Japan, Thailand, Joint 4 day mission amongst 3 countries to fight increasing piracy. Japan sends a patrol aircraft for the JC
Philippines operation
Aug 01 SCS Malaysia, Philippines Philippines President visit to Malaysia; both sides agreed to joint patrols and other counter measures against JA
piracy and kidnapping off Malaysia's Sabah state.
Aug 01 MS, SCS US, ASEAN US Coast Guard begins anti-piracy training for navies of ASEAN countries TA
Oct 01 MS, SCS Japan, ASEAN Asian Cooperation Conference on combating piracy, organized by Japan Coast Guard, brings together
maritime patrol officials from 9 Asian countries, providing them with anti-piracy technical information
Oct 01 SCS Japan, Philippines 1 day joint maritime exercise between Japan and Philippines Coast Guard near port of Maniela, involving 2 JC
ships and 3 helicopters.
Oct 01 North Japan, China Agreement signed to launch full-scale joint operations to combat piracy and other transnational crimes. Both JA
Asia sides also agree to share information and hold conferences once a year
Oct 01 Africa Kenya, Tanzania, Multilateral agreement signed to set up maritime search and rescue center in Mombasa GA
Seychelles
Oct 01 MS, SCS ASEAN Ministerial meeting on transnational crime issue joint communiqu6 recognizing need for region to deal with GA
more forms of transnational crime such as sea piracy
Oct 01 MS Indonesia, Singapore Mock pirate attack organized to highlight capabilities and cooperation level between both countries. JC
Nov 01 SCS Philippines, Indonesia $1.5 billion worth of oil accords signed, with discussion on how to improve border controls and ocean patrols GA
especially on security problems such as piracy, sea smuggling and terrorism.
Nov 01 MS, SCS Japan, ASEAN Japan proposes working group to explore ways of improving cooperation and study formulation of a regional IA
anti-piracy cooperation agreement. Acceptance of proposal led to negotiations for ReCAAP agreement.
Nov 01 MS Malaysia, Indonesia Navies launched 10 day joint maritime operation in Malacca Straits aimed at curbing piracy and other JC
unlawful maritime activities
Nov 01 Africa US, Yemen Economic, security and intelligence pact signed in US, with US joining western nations to help Yemen GA
establish maritime patrol forces to oprevent piracy in reeion.
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Feb 02 MS, SCS EU, ASEAN 1st ASEAN-EU Experts Group Meeting on Maritime Security discussed piracy, with EU offering assistance for TA
exchanging information, sponsoring ASEAN students for anti-piracy seminars, setting up training institutions
Mar 02 SCS Japan, Brunei Talks between both countries discuss joint ASEAN efforts to combat piracy and armed robbery in Southeast
Asian waters
Mar 02 MS, SCS 14 Asian countries Coast guard authorities together agree to create network to exchange information about piracy on Asian IA
seas on a daily basis
Mar 02 MS, SCS Japan, Indonesia Bilateral joint exercises between Indonesian coast guard, marine police and Japan coast guard. JC
Apr 02 MS US, Indonesia 2 day meeting between military officials of both countries to discuss issues such as piracy and terrorism,
though not a resumption of full military relations.
Jul 02 SCS Japan, Philippines Countries agree and begin 5-year JICA-PCG Human resource development training program for the TA
Philippines Coast guard, funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency
Aug 02 SCS Japan, Brunei Joint exercise between Brunei police force special operations section and Japan coast guard JC
Aug 02 MS Indonesia, Singapore 10t h anniversary of Indonesia-Singapore coordinated patrol, with both sides affirming that cooperation will JA
continue during talks between Singapore Defense minister and Indonesian President
Sep 02 MS India. Indonesia Joint coordinated patrols between both countries kicks off, as part of the defense agreement that was signed JC
between both countries in Jan 2001.
Oct 02 SCS Indonesia, New Foreign ministers at Inaugural meeting of Southwest Pacific Dialogue forum issued joint statement promising GA
Zealand, Australia, to boost cooperation in fight against terrorism and maritime issues like piracy.
Philippines, East
Timor, Papua New
Guinea
Oct 02 MS, SCS APEC Joint statement on counter-terrorism agree to enhance cooperation on fighting piracy in the region GA
Nov 02 MS, SCS ASEAN, China Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues agrees to IA
strengthen information action, personnel exchange, practical cooperation and joint research on piracy
Nov 02 MS, SCS ASEAN, India Joint statement of ASEAN-India Summit exchanged views and perspectives on non-traditional security GA
threats such as piracy and agreed to develop concrete program of cooperation
Nov 02 MS, SCS ASEAN, EU Both regional groups agreed on an ASEM seminar on anti-terrorism in China in 2003, agree to cooperate to GA
facilitate early implementation of UN Convention against transnational organized crime
Dec 02 SCS EU, China Treaty signed to cooperate on shipping matters, ensure fair access to each other's ports, and work to combat GA
terrorism and piracy
Dec 02 SCS Philippines, Indonesia Indonesian foreign minister visit to Philippines, and agreed for more cooperation in law enforcement to fight GA
against terrorism and piracy. Signed at the 3r d Joint Ministerial Commission on Bilateral Cooperation.
Mar 03 SCS Japan, Philippines Joint anti-piracy exercise held in Manila Bay, testing and evaluating Philippines and Japanese capabilities at JC
combating piracy and armed robbery against ships
Mar 03 Africa MOWCA countries, Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) agree in principle to an integrated sub-regional JA
IMO coast guard network for sub-regional cooperation for combating piracy and implementation of IMO codes
Jun 03 MS, SCS ARF Statement on cooperation against piracy and other security threats committed to encouraging bilateral and TA
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multilateral cooperation, introducing training in anti-piracy and providing capability-building infrastructure
Jul 03 MS Malaysia, Japan Malaysia seeks help from Japan to help set up its national coast guard, using Japanese coast guard as an TA
example. Japan sends patrol vessel to Malaysia for 5-day onboard training and information exchange.
Aug 03 North Russia, US, South Countries in 6 party talks participate in joint naval exercise in unprecedented joint staff and command JC
Asia Korea China, Japan, exercise to promote mutual understanding and cooperation to combat problems such as illegal drugs and
North Korea piracy
Aug 03 MS US, Indonesia US Trade and Development Agecy awards $845,000 for two transportation security projects to help RA
Indonesia comply with STAR initiative, and deter maritime piracy through electronic customs data reporting
Sep 03 MS, SCS APEC APEC meeting in Philippines draws up framework cooperation agreement on maritime safety, including GA
implementing a series of measures by July 2004 to focus on piracy at sea.
Oct 03 MS, SCS ASEAN ASEAN Concord 2 declaration adopted to create an ASEAN security, economic and social and cultural GA
community. Joint naval patrols to prevent piracy and joint ground exercises envisioned.
Oct 03 North China, Japan, South 3 countries agree in landmark cooperation to reduce military weapons to alleviate Northeast Asia tensions, GA
Asia Korea but also to enhance cooperation in transnational crimes such as piracy.
Oct 03 MS, SCS Japan, ASEAN Transport ministers endorse 16 projects for implementation, including a maritime transport security GA
program
Oct 03 10 India, Thailand Both sides agree to joint patrols of the Bay of Bengal and Andaman sea areas to ensure zones of peace and JA
development.
Nov 03 MS, SCS Japan, 15 Asian Japan agrees to fund a new information sharing center on piracy, to be located in the Southeast Asian IA
nations region. Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and South Korea are bidding for it.
Nov 03 MS, SCS IMO First IMO Asian office set up in the Philippines, as part of IMO regional presence for technical cooperation
against piracy in Asia. A new counter-terrorism code for ports will also be implemented on July 1,2004
Dec 03 MS Singapore, Japan Largest counter-terrorism and piracy exercise held, first maritime security exercise between both countries, JC
involving 120 officers and 10 patrol crafts from both coast guards
Dec 03 MS, SCS ASEAN, Japan Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring ASEAN-Japan Partnership in the New Millennium, agreeing GA
to enhance anti-piracy cooperation through ARF, APT processes
Dec 03 MS, SCS Japan, Indonesia Japan PM Koizumi pledges $921 million in loans to Indonesia to fight piracy along sea route for oil tankers, EA
Indonesia's President Megawati said she would consider the offer
Dec 03 MS Singapore, Indonesia Both countries agree to step up joint patrols to combat piracy problem and participate in multilateral effort JA
started by Japan, in bilateral talks during Singapore's DPM Dr. Tony Tan's visit to Indonesia
Jan 04 MS Malaysia, Indonesia Bilateral talks during Malaysia PM Badawi's visit to Indonesia pledged to fight piracy and strengthen IA
cooperation by sharing information.
Jan 04 MS, SCS ASEAN Joint Communique at ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime recognizes increasing trends of GA
terrorism and other forms of transnational crime, such as piracy and adopt concept plan to address problem.
Feb 04 MS, SCS 25 Asia Pacific nations Asia pacific ministerial meeting agreed to explored ways of enhancing cooperation among law enforcement GA
agencies to fight against maritime piracy.
Feb 04 SCS Japan. Thailand Joint counter-piracy drill between Japan Coast Guard and Thailand maritime police JC
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Feb 04 SCS Japan, Philippines Japan coast guard instructs Philippines Coast guard about the inspection of ships as well as how to handle JC
evidence from crimes at sea.
Feb 04 MS India, Indonesia India ship calls at Indonesian port, as part of 2001 agreement. The 2 nations have been conducting joint JC
patrols and exercises regularly.
Mar 04 MS, SCS ARF Conference on transport security, ARF member states agree to increase cooperation to stop terrorist attacks GA
and other transnational crime.
April MS United State, US proposes Regional Maritime Security Initiative to combat transnational threats such as piracy by
04 Malaysia, Singapore, deploying high speed vessels to flush out criminals. Malaysia and Indonesia oppose RMSI strongly
Indonesia
May 04 MS Indonesia, Malaysia, Indonesia proposes seminar on maritime security and Malaysia agrees to host it by end of the year, with US GA
Singapore as a co-sponsor.
Jun 04 MS, SCS 16 Asian countries 1St Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies meeting unanimously adopts Asia Maritime Security Initiative
(AMSI), and discusses ways of tackling possible terrorist attacks and piracy at sea.
Jun 04 MS FPDA countries Ministers agree to include training against maritime terrorism in future exercises and plan to hold more TA
regular intelligence exchanges on terrorism and other security issues
Jun 04 MS US, Malaysia US offer to share anti-terror intelligence with Malaysia and boost "technical competency" of countries IA
guarding Malacca Straits. Malaysia accepts intelligence help, but refuse US cooperation in patrols
Jun 04 MS Malaysia, Singapore, 3 countries agree to year round joint naval patrols, expanding from current 4 yearly patrols, and setting up JA
Indonesia 24 hour communications system using common radio frequencies. However, no "hot pursuit"
Jul 04 MS, SCS ARF ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Strengthening Transport Security Against International Terrorism agree JA
to hold simulation and joint exercises against piracy, strengthen legal framework and practical cooperation
Aug 04 MS Singapore, Indonesia Both countries sign agreement on joint maritime patrols, agreeing to open their security posts to all JA
commercial ships threatened by sea pirates
Aug 04 MS Singapore, Thailand, Thailand joins other 3 countries to conduct coordinated patrols, a move that is outside usual policy of JC
Malaysia, Indonesia involving only the coastal states. Countries still in consultations of expanding patrols to Andaman Sea.
Aug 04 Africa France, South Africa Both countries discuss cooperation in the fight against maritime piracy, and agree to deliver 2 patrol boats to RA
Mozambique, which they are helping to combat piracy.
Sep 04 MS FPDA countries Joint anti-piracy and anti-terrorism exercise held in Straits of Malacca and South China Sea, involving over 30 JC
vessels, 90 aircraft and commando units, comprising 4000 personnel.
Oct 04 Asia India, South Korea Both countries agree to cooperate on matters involving safety and security of international maritime traffic GA
by coordinating agencies for anti-piracy, search and rescue operations.
Oct 04 Africa US, EU countries, 11 US European command hosts Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security conference in Italy, ending with joint
African countries statement pledging to engage in dialogue and cooperation, "Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security initiative"
Nov 04 MS, SCS 16 Asian nations Countries agree to set up piracy information sharing center in Singapore to share information related to IA
crime and prevention measures, as part of ReCAAP agreement. Idea initiated by Japan.
Nov 04 MS, SCS ASEAN, Australia, New Joint Declaration at the ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Commemorative Summit agree to take urgent GA
Zealand steps to prevent and combat piracy through effective institutional linkages and cooperation programs
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Dec 04 MS Japan, Malaysia Japan defense chief meets Malaysia deputy prime minister to discuss counterterrorism cooperation, defense GA
issues and safety in Malacca Straits
Jan 05 Africa US, Gulf of Guinea US deploys large warship to Gulf of Guinea to visit 3 countries and help train local navies, as a result of Oct TA
nations 04 security conference
Feb 05 MS Japan, Singapore Ministers meet in Singapore and agree to cooperate in ensuring maritime safety and combating piracy in GA
Asian region
Mar 05 MS, SCS Japan, ASEAN 2 nd ASEAN-Japan Seminar on maritime security and combating piracy agrees to build cooperative relations IA
among agencies and share information on maritime security in the Asian region.
Mar 05 SCS Singapore, India Navies of both sides hold 10-day maritime exercise in South China Sea, with a mix of traditional navy-to-navy JC
exercise and also elements of anti-piracy interdiction.
Mar 05 MS IMO, Singapore, Agreement for IMO to launch "marine electronic highway project" to enhance safety in Southeast Asia to IA
Malaysia, Indonesia share critical security-related information and intelligence among select countries and promote coordination
among countries. Has the support and cooperation from all 3 coastal states surround Malacca Straits.
Apr 05 SCS Malaysia, Philippines Both sides agree to step up coordinated patrols in Sulawesi sea to deter piracy attacks. Current twice yearly JA
patrols between Malaysia's Sabah and Borneo island will be increased in numbers, frequency and duration.
Jul 05 MS, SCS ASEAN, Pakistan ASEAN - Pakistan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism agree to implement measures GA
contained in ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Security
Jul 05 MS, SCS Japan, Indonesia Anti-piracy cooperation agreement signed, with Indonesia accepting Japan's offer to provide patrol boats to RA
guard pirate infested waterways. Japan coast guard will also train Indonesia coast guard officials
Apr 05 Asia Japan, India 8 fold initiative agreed upon between both prime ministers, including agreement for both coast guards to JA
commence working together on sustained basis such as annual talks, information sharing and joint exercises
Apr 05 SCS China, Indonesia Both countries announced new partnership which includes provisions for maritime cooperation GA
May 05 SCS Japan, Philippines Defense chiefs agree to hold regular top-level defense dialogue once a year to strengthen cooperation, and GA
agree to join forces in combating piracy
May 05 MS US, Malaysia Both sides agree to expand military cooperation and renew military logistics pact "access and cross-servicing GA
agreement", also mentioning possible greater cooperation over piracy.
May 05 MS, SCS 18 Pacific rim group West Pacific Naval Symposium hold first joint sea exercises to test how well ships and aircraft work together, JC
countries hosted by Singapore.
May 05 MS Singapore, Indonesia Launched system that provides real-time radar surveillance against piracy and terrorism, "SURPIC"
agreement, allowing for real-time surveillance of Singapore Straits.
May 05 10 India, Thailand Both countries sign Memorandum of understanding for joint maritime patrols to prevent piracy and arms JA
smuggling.
Jun 05 MS, SCS Japan, Indonesia Both sides agree to launch negotiations on bilateral FTA, which includes enhancing cooperation in navigation GA
safety such as fighting against maritime piracy
Jun 05 SCS Indonesia, Thailand Indonesia and Thailand navies agree to enhance cooperation to increase security in Malacca straits, but IA
without "hot pursuit". They also agree to increase information exchanges to improve security in the straits.
Jul 05 MS, SCS Indonesia, Japan Indonesia has accepted Japan's offer to provide patrol boats to fight against piracy, and for Japan to conduct TA
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training programs to raise skills of Indonesian Coast Guard, as part of anti-piracy cooperation agreement.
Jul 05 SCS Philippines, Malaysia 2 week joint exercise in Philippine waters, aimed at boosting inter-operability and cooperation. 8 th joint JC
exercise between both navies.
Aug 05 MS Malaysia, Indonesia, Defense force chiefs agree to "Eye in the sky project", a series of air patrols over Malacca Straits to increase JA
Singapore, Thailand security. Beginning in September 2005, it operates 7 days a week and can cross country borders
Aug 05 SCS Philippines, Australia Both sides established a bilateral mechanism for discussion and discuss prospect of cooperation on border GA
management and security, maritime patrols, and cooperation against transnational crimes such as piracy.
Aug 05 SCS Japan, Brunei 2nd joint exercise between Japan coast guard and Brunei marine police, including Brunei air force for the first JC
time.
Sep 05 MS FPDA countries Joint exercise held around Malaysia Peninsular, 2 week long, to train capacity to respond to non- JC
conventional threat. Code-named "Exercise Bersama Lima"
Sep 05 SCS China, Cambodia China gives Cambodia patrol boats, totaling $1 million to help impoverished country crack down on drug RA
trafficking, human smuggling and piracy.
Sep 05 MS India, Indonesia 5th coordinated patrols between India and Indonesia, since they started in September 2002. JC
Sep 05 MS IMO, Malaysia, Marine electronic highway project launched, to monitor ships passing through straits. Follow-up on March
Indonesia, Singapore, 2005 agreement.
Sep 05 MS Indonesia, Malaysia Joint patrols in Malacca Straits, 1 week long. 100 police officers from both countries involved. JC
Sep 05 10 India, United States Joint exercise Malabar 2005 held in Arabian Sea, focusing on aviation inter-operability and operations for JC
countering anti-piracy and counter terrorism.
Oct 05 MS, SCS ASEAN, Japan, China, Japan Coast guard conducts training course for maritime law enforcement officials from ASEAN countries, JC
South Korea China, and South Korea
Oct 05 MS, SCS ARF ARF workshop on training for cooperative maritime security held in India, attended by delegates from 14
countries.
Nov 05 10 India, Sri Lanka Countries begin "coordinated patrolling" along international maritime border. Patrols still in experimental JC
stage - forces cannot cross international borders,
Nov 05 SCS Singapore, South Both sides reaffirm cooperation in maritime security and anti-piracy in the region. GA
Korea
Nov 05 MS, SCS United States, United States lifts lethal arms ban on Indonesia, so that it can now improve its security in the Malacca Straits
Indonesia,
Nov 05 Africa United States, $50 million deal signed for US to supply vessels and equipment for Somalia to use in fight against illegal RA
Somalia, fishing and piracy off Somalia. NY-based security firm to also help Somalia set up 5 naval bases.
Dec 05 MS, SCS ASEAN, Russia Joint Declaration of ASEAN and the Russian Federation on Progressive and Comprehensive Partnership agree GA
to enhance cooperation against piracy through ASEAN-Russia Meeting on Transnational Crime
Dec 05 MS Singapore, Malaysia, New agreement signed for new Standard Operating Procedures for strait patrols. New agreement includes JA
Thailand, Indonesia Thailand, and also allows for "hot pursuit"
Dec 05 MS Japan, India Both countries agreed to strengthening of ties in maritime security in the Malacca Straits, especially with GA
regards to maritime piracy
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Dec 05 Africa Ethiopia, Somalia, Sanaa Forum met and called for common security role in the region's waters to prevent maritime piracy and
Sudan, Yemen enhance stability
Jan 06 MS, SCS G8, Pacific rim Countries pledge to boost cooperation to ensure security in Malacca Straits GA
countries
Jan 06 SCS Japan, Philippines Joint exercise between both countries involving patrol ships and helicopters from both coast guards JC
Jan 06 MS, SCS EU, ASEAN Pact between both regional groupings, EU agree to provide 4.5million Euros in EU training assistance to TA
border control agencies to reduce arms smuggling and maritime piracy
Mar 06 MS, SCS Japan, Malaysia Japan coast guard hands ships over to Malaysia coast guard agency to help in piracy cooperation RA
Mar 06 10 India, United States Maritime cooperation framework agreed upon, agreeing to enhance security in the maritime domain, GA
preventing piracy and other transnational crime at sea.
Mar 06 Asia India, Korea Memorandum of Understanding signed, envisaging cooperation in prevention of piracy and other maritime GA
crimes between both coast guards. Both coast guards held first ever joint exercise in Korea in Nov 2005
Mar 06 Africa EU, IGAD EU offers Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an African regional body, $344 million to RA
deal with migration, refugees, reconstruct Sudan and help fight piracy in Somalia.
Apr 06 Africa United States, 11 Regional workshop "Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea" hosted by United States, and US-
African countries Gambia security partnership against piracy came in for praise.
Apr 06 MS, SCS 11 ReCAAP countries South Korea, India, Sri Lanka signed ReCAAP agreement initiated by Japan, bringing number of countries to IA
11. Pact is aimed at information sharing, capacity building and easing extradition.
Apr 06 Africa United States, Somalia Somalia granted US navy permission to patrol Somalia coastal waters to combat maritime piracy. US will also
help Somalia set up a coast guard.
Apr 06 MS Singapore, Indonesia, New agreement signed formalizing coordinated anti-piracy patrols, with renewed invitation to Thailand to JA
Malaysia help stamp problem after it withdrew in February 2006. "Malacca Straits patrol" agreement.
May 06 Asia India, Japan During India defense minister visit to Japan, both countries agreed to enhance cooperation by holding JA
annual coast guard talks and joint exercises for anti-piracy
May 06 SCS US, Philippines Both countries expand on 1951 mutual defense treaty for security ties to cover non-traditional military GA
threats such as piracy, terrorism.
Jun 06 MS, SCS Japan, Singapore 6 member anti-piracy team set up by Japan in Singapore, under the auspices of ReCAAP, to collect
information on piracy attacks, share information, and devise strategies for dealing with problem
Jun 06 Africa US, African countries Regional conference on maritime security in Nigeria, agreed on joint measures, with US assistance, to
confront piracy threats by equipping coastal nations with AIS network and 4 naval task groups
Jun 06 MS, SCS Japan, Indonesia Japan donates 3 patrol boats to Indonesia to help fight terrorism and piracy. The donation is exempted from RA
the ban on arms exports, and were given in response to Indonesia's requests for help
Jun 06 MS, SCS 10 Asian countries ReCAAP agreement is finally ratified by 10 countries and will go into force in September 2006. First regional GA
government to government agreement to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia.
Jun 06 Africa West and Central African states agree to create joint coastguard force to fight piracy, pollution, through maritime organization JA
Africa States, G8 of West and Central Africa. Received pledges of support from South Korea, France, EU, US, Canada, UK.
countries
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Jun 06 Africa United States, Sierra US gives Sierra Leone 3 patrol boats, providing intensive training on basic boat driving and patrol craft to RA
Leone Sierra Leone maritime wing.
Jul 06 MS, SCS ASEAN, Canada ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism agree to Implement GA
measures contained in ARF statements
Jul 06 MS, SCS Japan, Indonesia Japan and Indonesia explore cooperation in investigation of an attack on a Japanese shipping vessel in March
2006, off Indonesia. This is the first time Japan has exercised the investigative right on an external crime
Jul 06 Asia Japan, India Japan coast guard training ship calls in Indian port, as part of the India-Japan coast guard cooperation JC
program
Jul 06 Asia India, South Korea 5 day joint exercise carried out between both sides, as part of existing cooperation agreement. JC
Aug 06 SCS United States, Joint military exercise (CARAT) with 1200 American troops and Philippine troops to address seaborne threats JC
Philippines such as armed robbery, piracy
Sep 06 10 France, India Strategic partnership agreed through joint cooperation, and both sides agree that piracy must be met head GA
on
Sep 06 MS FPDA countries Joint military exercise in Singapore to tackle various scenarios of threats such as terrorism and piracy, agree JC
to enhance cooperation.
Nov 06 Asia Japan, India Joint exercise held by coast guards of both countries off Mumbai, India, and is the 7t h such exercise held JC
alternately in Indian and Japanese waters. More than 10 ships and aircraft were involved
Nov 06 10 United States, India Joint exercise Malabar 2006 held to practice visiting, boarding, search and seizure operations to improve JC
anti-piracy and counter-terrorism operations
Nov 06 MS, SCS 14 Asian nations Information sharing center opens in Singapore to collect information on piracy attacks, make data available
to governments on a secure network, and provide anti-piracy training. Cost borne by Singapore and Japan.
Nov 06 Africa 11 West and Central African states, backed by EU and US, signed pact to make big improvements in maritime security to stamp GA
African states, EU, US out piracy and other illegal activity
Jan 07 SCS Japan, Malaysia, I st ever joint trilateral exercise involving the 3 countries, organized to bolster cooperation against piracy JC
Thailand attacks at sea.
Jan 07 MS, SCS 21 ARF countries 1 st operational, table-top exercise held in Singapore, aimed at shoring up defenses against maritime security JC
threats. 21 nations took part in simulated exercise
Feb 07 Africa Kenya, Tanzania, Joint task force to conduct anti-piracy and collective maritime security proposed.
Mozambique
Mar 07 MS, SCS Japan, Indonesia Indonesia requests help from Japan to establish a Coast Guard, and Japan donates three patrol boats to RA
Indonesia.
Mar 07 Asia Japan, Australia Countries sign defense and security declaration to cooperate on counter terrorism and counter-piracy GA
operations
Mar 07 10 US, India Joint exercise Malabar 07 exercise held off coast of Japan, navies practice maneuvers against piracy and JC
terrorism.
Apr 07 MS India, Indonesia Security agreement comes into effect, paving way for joint production of military equipment, human JA
resource training, exchange of officers, ioint border patrols to fight piracy and terrorism.
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May 07 Asia Japan, India India Foreign Minister visits Japan to discuss ways to jointly secure sea lanes in Indian ocean against piracy. GA
Both sides reaffirmed commitment to secure sea lanes in Indian Ocean from piracy to ensure safe passage.
May 07 MS, SCS 19 WPNS countries Joint maritime exercise to get crews from different backgrounds working together to take out pirates and JC
terrorists, and included information exchange seminar.
May 07 Africa US, West African US boosts naval presence along west African coast, touring 6 countries, in lead up to deployment of 6 month
countries US navy vessel deployment, following up on Gulf of Guinea conference for promoting anti-piracy
cooperation
May 07 Asia Japan, India, US Three countries in joint navy exercises. First time all three countries are involved, and also the first time JC
navies are participating in the joint exercise.
Jun 07 SCS US Philippines 10 day war-training exercise, CARAT, focusing on exchanging information and exercises on tactical and JC
amphibious training
Jun 07 MS US, Singapore, US donates 10 radar systems to Malacca Straits states to boost security against piracy RA
Malaysia, Indonesia
Jun 07 MS India, Indonesia 1st ever joint defense cooperation committee creates framework for broad spectrum of cooperation in GA
defense, including coordinated patrolling by navies for anti-piracy
Jun 07 SCS Malaysia, Indonesia, Agreement signed on information exchange and establishment of communication procedures. System IA
Philippines, Thailand, introduced to facilitate exchange of information through database sharing.
Cambodia, Brunei
Aug 07 SCS Singapore, South Memorandum of Understanding signed between coast guards of both countries to beef up efforts by both GA
Korea sides to contain piracy and maritime terrorism.
Aug 07 10 India, US Agreement for bilateral framework and to cooperate in prevention of acts of transnational crime such as JA
piracy, and exploring ways of operationalizing cooperation such as through joint anti-piracy patrols
Aug 07 MS, SCS ASEAN, Australia Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Partnership agree to promote closer cooperation to GA
combat piracy by undertaking joint activities based on existing agreements and mechanisms
Aug 07 MS, SCS India, ARF countries India offers training modules to ARF states on maritime security, with themes of anti-piracy search and TA
rescue missions.
Sep 07 Asia US, Japan, Australia, 5 countries participate in a 6 day joint exercise that is one of the biggest ever peacetime joint military JC
Singapore, India exercises. Included 27 ships for anti-piracy, reconnaissance, rescue missions off coast of India
Sep 07 Africa South Africa, NATO Joint military exercises to help protect African coastline from piracy JC
Nov 07 SCS China, Cambodia China donates 9 patrol vessels and related facilities to Cambodia, reinforcing navy and improving maritime RA
security, including anti-piracy operations. Given as a $60million soft loan from China.
Nov 07 Africa US, North Korea North Korea thanks US for helping to end standoff with Somalia pirates, referring to unprecedented
cooperation between both countries. North Korea says this collaboration is a symbol of cooperation.
Nov 07 MS Greece, Singapore, Greece donates $1 million to help secure Malacca Straits during UN IMO meeting. RA
Malaysia, Indonesia
Dec 07 MS, SCS Japan, Indonesia Japan delivers 3 patrol boats to help Indonesia in handling maritime piracy
Table 2. Instances of Cooperation against Maritime Piracy. (Source: Archived newspaper articles retrieved from Factiva database, 2008)
(Cooperation type: JA - agreement for joint exercise/patrol/operations, IA - agreement for info. Sharing, TA - agreement for cross-training, RA - agreement for
resource transfer, GA - general agreements for cooperation, JC - Instance of joint exercise/patrol/operation) 83
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4.5 Evaluation of international cooperation in Asia
We first present a quick summary of the above data collation.
No. of cooperation instances in total:
Total in Asia:
Subtotal in Southeast Asia:
Malacca Straits
South China Sea
Both in Malacca Straits & South China Sea
Subtotal in Indian Ocean:
Additional instances in Asia:
Total in Africa:
Total in Panama:
Further breakdown of Anti-piracy cooperation in East Asia (Excludes
No. of Joint patrol/exercise agreements: (JA)
No. of training agreements: (TA)
No. of agreements for information sharing: (IA)
No. of agreements for transfer of resources: (RA)
No. of additional general agreements for cooperation: (GA)
No. of joint patrols/exercises recorded: (JC)
No. of bilateral/trilateral agreements:
No. of multilateral agreements:
No. of independent instances of cooperation:
206
186
156
53
40
63
11
19
19
1
Indian Ocean):
22
11
15
8
55
38
73
38
103
Before we proceed with the rest of the analysis, I first qualify the summarizing statistics
presented above, as well as those listed subsequently, by recognizing that there may be a
relatively significant margin of error in the numbers, simply due to the nature of the subject
that we are trying to study. For example, as mentioned earlier, I could have missed instances of
cooperation that had not been reported in the print media, despite the cooperation having
taken place. Indeed, if we adopt Bradford's definition of "operationalized cooperation",
referring to the highly-prized form of cooperation that can be carried out independently by
middle rank officials, then we should not witness the reporting of such cooperation when they
occur. Furthermore, we recognize that because the type of cooperation varies across different
regions, the nature of some forms of cooperation and the criteria that we have adopted result
in us failing to accurately report those instances of cooperation in our dataset. For example, the
United States Navy's Task Force 150 and 152, operating in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian
Gulf respectively, are multilateral cooperation initiatives that resulted from the United States'
War on Terrorism and subsequently expanded into anti-piracy cooperation. These instances of
cooperation did not result from publicly-available cooperation agreements, and therefore were
not coded in the dataset.84 It is for these reasons that the summary statistics are merely meant
to give the reader an overview of the data; the reader is encouraged to analyze the raw data
himself in closer detail, and expand upon the dataset as he deems fit.
Nevertheless, the numbers suggest that there has been a substantial level of
cooperation amongst Asian countries, organized at multiple levels. In absolute terms, the
Southeast Asian region, especially around the Malacca Straits, has been the main target for
international cooperation agreements amongst nation states. The coastal states of Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia have together been party to at least 53 instances of cooperation, both
amongst themselves and vis-a-vis their extra-regional partners, to eradicate the problem of
piracy in the narrow waterway. These instances of cooperation have occurred above and
beyond the agreements that the three countries have made with their ASEAN counterparts,
84 Department of Defense Documents, Maritime Ops in Middle East Have Deterrent Effect, American Forces
Information Service News Articles. April 27, 2006.
which typically focus on similar problems in the South China Sea, as well as agreements that
have been reached collectively at the ASEAN level, which I have coded as cooperation that falls
under both water regions.
In addition, the nature of cooperation within Asia has moved beyond being simply "talk
shop" discussions. Joint patrols agreements (22), law enforcement training arrangements (11),
and information sharing collaborations (15) have been reached, along with the provision of
significant levels of financial and equipment aid by extra-regional powers to the weaker states
(8 instances). In addition, a large number of joint exercises (38) have been conducted amongst
navies and law enforcement agencies in the region, ranging from table-top simulation exercises
to year-round joint patrols with integration of air and sea assets across territorial boundaries.
As discussed, I have sought to be as inclusive as possible in our database by coding all
reported instances of cooperation. Yet, such an approach unavoidably codes multiple instances
of cooperation that arises from the same agreement. I therefore counted the number of
"independent sets" of cooperation, and nevertheless still witnessed a high level of cooperation
(103 instances) in the region. Furthermore, this cooperation has involved a wide variety of
countries in the region - no single country has monopolized cooperation in Asia, though a small
group of countries, such as Japan, India and the ASEAN grouping appear to have spearheaded
most of the cooperation.
The data therefore suggests that a dense of assortment of cooperation have been
agreed upon in the region, and they have materialized in all shapes and forms, involving
different combinations of states in the region.
4.6 Incidence of Maritime Piracy attacks around the world
As a quick extension to the analysis, I test if the high levels of cooperation in Asia over
the past decade can be explained simply by the incidence of piracy in the region over the same
period. In effect, this forms the null hypothesis of the thesis, since a positive result would imply
that the levels of cooperation we have been witnessing in Asia, and especially in Southeast Asia,
have not been unique.
Year Malacca Straits South China Sea Indian Ocean East Africa West Africa
1995* 13 55 17 10 5
1996* 12 120 35 5 17
1997* 10 100 45 12 35
1998 6 94 25 19 22
1999 37 136 51 16 36
2000 112 140 109 29 33
2001 36 88 56 12 51
2002 24 112 46 14 39
2003 15 114 77 11 59
2004 35 86 31 7 43
2005 10 81 39 22 21
2006 16 50 38 14 26
Total 326 1176 569 171 387
Table 3 Number of annual piracy attacks by region, from 1995-2006. (Source: IMO Piracy and Armed Robbery
Annual Reports (1998-2006))
* Numbers were estimated from IMO graph as Annual reports were not readily available
To perform this analysis, I first tabulate the number of piracy attacks annually in each region
from 1995 to 2006, as shown in Table 3. I then compare the total number of piracy attacks in
each region with the levels of cooperation that have emerged.
160 MS+ SCS
Instances of Cooperation vs. @
140 No. of Piracy attacks
120 1995-2007
100
80 Linear best fit
U 80
Hz through origin
S 40
Africa
20
SIndian Ocean
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
No. of Piracy Attacks
Figure 4. Comparison of cooperation level vs. number of piracy attacks, across different regions.
While it is a little difficult to perform this comparison because of the cross-regional
nature of some of the cooperation agreements, and also because there is a significantly greater
number of piracy attacks in Southeast Asia compared to the other regions, I nevertheless
observe that Southeast Asia has witnessed a much higher level of cooperation than would have
been expected if I had averaged over all the regions in the world. Figure 4 shows a simple
regression of the number of instances of cooperation against the number of piracy attacks that
actually occurred in each region. It shows clearly that the level of cooperation is significantly
higher than would have been expected if we compared it the global average, as represented by
the linear best fit line. This allows us to conclude with relatively high confidence that the
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Southeast Asian region has witnessed a unique level of cooperation against maritime piracy,
thereby begging the question of how this cooperation has materialized.
4.7 Brief Evaluation of Cooperation Effectiveness
Having noticed the cooperation that has been targeted at Southeast Asia, I take this
opportunity to conduct a brief test of whether the cooperation has been effective in eradicating
the maritime piracy problem in the region. Recall from Chapter 3 that I had also compiled a
database of the geographical location of all piracy attacks throughout the world over the past
two decades. Here, I utilize this database to compare the incidence of piracy attacks in the
Southeast Asian region before and after international cooperation has taken place in the
region.
sm-. 
soft, *
I Uw I Io ,
Piracy Attacks * Legend Piracy Attacks . Legend
in Asia 2003 * Piracy attack in Asia 2006 * Piracy
Figure 5. Comparison of piracy attacks in Southeast Asia in 2003 and 2006. (Source: Data created using NGASanti-shipping messages and ArcGIS software, with help from MIT Libraries ArcGIS staff)
Figure 5 shows a comparison of the number of piracy attacks in the Southeast Asian region over
two different time periods - 2003 and 2006. 2003 represents the year with the peak number of
piracy attacks in the Southeast Asian region, and it is perhaps unsurprising that a series of
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cooperation efforts emerged in the region soon after. On the other hand, 2006 is the last year
where I have a complete year's worth of data, though I believe that three years is sufficient for
us to witness at least some of the effects from the cooperation efforts. Each red dot shows an
attempted or actual piracy incident that was recorded, and the two graphs indicate that while
the region has not managed to eradicate piracy in the short span of three years, there has
nevertheless been a significant reduction in the number of piracy attacks in the region.
I am acutely aware that this set of evidence and analysis is woefully inadequate for
concluding the effect of international cooperation on eradicating piracy in the region, since I
have only compared the data over a single period, and have done so at a very broad regional
level. I have also failed to account for the effect of individual acts of cooperation on maritime
piracy within those countries, as well as perform any sort of process tracing that is undoubtedly
necessary to ascertain the true effect of the anti-piracy cooperation. Nevertheless, the data
suggests that there has been a sharp drop in the incidence of piracy in the region, and hence it
is reasonable for us to assume that international cooperation during this period has at least had
some positive effect on curbing piracy in the region.
4.8 Conclusion
Observing that there has not been a unified consensus on the state of cooperation
against maritime piracy, and that there has been a lack of publicly available data on this topic, I
have sought to create our own database by collating all instances of cooperation that have
attempted to tackle this growing problem over the past two decades. I acutely recognize that
the dataset has only begun to address some of the debates in the maritime piracy literature,
and hence the claims that I am making from our analysis of the data alone are modest. For
instance, a more complete analysis of international cooperation against maritime piracy
requires greater analysis on the effectiveness of the cooperation, as suggested in the literature
review in this chapter. Further analysis is therefore required to explore the direct interaction
between international cooperation and its effect on eradicating maritime piracy, such as by
evaluating the ability for joint cooperation to recover ships that have been attacked. There is
little doubt that the dataset requires more work.
Nevertheless, I believe that the maritime piracy database that I have made publicly
available is a significant contribution to the literature, and that meaningful conclusions about
the nature of international cooperation can already be drawn from the data. In particular, the
frequency count of cooperation instances in Asia suggests that international cooperation
against maritime piracy has indeed developed in the region, in spite of the difficulties that I
have described in Chapter 3, as well as the fact that this does not directly corroborate with
theories of international cooperation against traditional security threats, which I discussed in
Chapter 2. Why and how did this cooperation develop? I provide two possible answers to this
question in the next two chapters of the thesis.
Chapter 5: The "ASEAN Way" - The Path to Non-traditional
Cooperation?
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is Southeast Asia's primary regional
institution, established on 8 August 1967 to accelerate economic growth, social progress and
cultural development in the region, as well as promote regional peace and stability through the
respect for justice and the rule of law. 85 However, ASEAN has been periodically criticized for its
supposed inability to promote cooperation, especially in the area of security; in recent times,
the association has even been accused of hindering cooperation in the region. This criticism has
often been directed at a set of norms collectively referred to as the "ASEAN way", and at the
principle of non-interference in particular, whereby member states agree not to interfere in the
domestic affairs of their neighbors.
In the realm of maritime piracy cooperation, similar pessimism towards ASEAN's role in
promoting cooperation exists. Many scholars suggest that due to 1) the stark differences in
security interests amongst member states, 2) the principle of non-interference, and 3) the non-
binding nature of ASEAN agreements, the future looks bleak for multilateral cooperation in the
region.8 Instead, piracy experts suggest that the region should look towards the involvement
of extra-regional powers (Discussed in Chapter 6) and bilateral cooperation as alternative
avenues for promoting cooperation in the region. In particular, John Bradford (Bradford, 2005),
85 About ASEAN in aseansec.org website
86 In reference to the non-binding nature of ASEAN agreements, from its inception in 1967 to 1997, the only
exceptions to this policy were the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and 1992 Agreement on
Timetable for ASEAN FTA. See Rodolfo C. Severino, "Will ASEAN be like the EU?" Remarks at the European
Policy Center (23 March 2001) http://www.aseansec.ora/3112.htm
p. 81-82) argues that bilateral cooperation is more productive than multilateral cooperation in
producing "operational maritime cooperation", and that a network of bilateral arrangements
may even be a better substitute for multilateral cooperation amongst the ASEAN nations.
The notion of a network of bilateral cooperation is appealing, and by analyzing the
evolution of maritime piracy cooperation in Asia over the past decade, I show that a growing
"spider web of cooperation" has indeed emerged.87 However, the literature has not adequately
explained how this network has emerged, and in this regard, I adopt a more sanguine view of
ASEAN's role in non-traditional security cooperation. Using the theory of policy innovation
diffusion (Berry & Berry, 1999), I contend that ASEAN summits and forums played the critical
role of providing the informal platform for policy diffusion across national borders. Multilateral
institutions such as ASEAN have been critical for facilitating the creation of alternative forms of
cooperation, and from a theoretical standpoint, this chapter therefore argues against the
traditional belief that institutions have to be resolution-binding in order to increase the
likelihood of cooperation, at least in the realm of international cooperation against non-state
threats.88
The way forward in this chapter is as follows: After surveying the literature on ASEAN
and the prospects for security cooperation, I analyze the nature of anti-piracy cooperation
within Southeast Asia and describe the growing network of cooperation that has emerged. I
17 In 1989, General Try Sutrisno, chief of Indonesian Armed Forces, first used the term "defense spider web" to
describe the pattern of bilateral links in Asia. See Straits Times(Weekly Overseas Edition), 9 Dec 1989
88 By resolution binding, I refer to the ability of multilateral institutions to enforce cooperation such as through the
use of sanctions and diplomatic threats.
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then describe the theoretical underpinnings of the diffusion of policy innovation, and show how
ASEAN has been the ideal avenue for the diffusion of cooperation policies against piracy.
Finally, I conclude that non-traditional security threats not only reinvigorates ASEAN's role in
promoting security cooperation, but also that these threats may in fact be acting as a catalyst
for additional security cooperation at the multilateral level in future.
5.1 The "ASEAN Way"
In contrast with multilateral organizations from other regions, ASEAN's distinctive
feature is its unique approach to regional interaction and cooperation. Often referred to as the
"ASEAN Way", this approach comprises a set of norms and principles that ASEAN participants
agree to abide by, especially with regards to conflict prevention and conflict resolution. First
formalized in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and originally signed by the five
founding members, the treaty has since been extended to all its ten current members, as well
as many of ASEAN's key partners in the world, including Papua New Guinea (1989), China
(2003), India (2003), Japan (2004), Pakistan (2004), Republic of Korea (2004), Russian
Federation (2004), Australia (2005), New Zealand (2005) and France (2007).89 The treaty states
that ASEAN participants should abide to four basic principles in their actions: respect for
territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of another member,
settlement of disputes peacefully, and renunciation of threat through the use of force. In
addition, the principles include a set of procedural norms, such as seeking agreement and
89 (ASEAN, 2005)
harmony, sensitivity, politeness, non-confrontation, being non-Cartesian, and being non-
legalistic. 90
These principles have become synonymous with ASEAN over the years, and are often
the subject of much debate. Most recently, the principle of non-interference was highlighted
during Myanmar's violent crackdown on domestic uprising in October 2007. ASEAN came under
increasing international criticism for its refusal to impose sanctions on Myanmar or expel the
regime from the group, and U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab even lamented that
negotiations for a US-ASEAN FTA were being threatened by ASEAN's posture.9' She chastised
ASEAN that "the reputation and credibility of ASEAN as an organization has been called into
question because of the situation in Burma". 92
5.2 ASEAN and Security Cooperation: (another) Literature Review
A variety of reasons have been proposed to explain ASEAN's emphasis on this particular
set of norms, including the diversity of interests amongst member states, the consequences of
power concentration in small elite circles as the region decolonized, the lack of a historical
regional legal system, as well as the domestic communist insurgencies member state
governments were fighting during ASEAN's inception."9 Despite the justifications, however, the
"ASEAN way" remains criticized for hindering cooperation in the region. Saravanamuttu, for
90 (Desker, 2007; Goh, 2003)
91 International Herald Tribune "Rift over Myanmar emerges at Asean Summit", Nov 19, 2007.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/19/asia/asean.php
92 International Herald Tribune "Rift over Myanmar emerges at Asean Summit", Nov 19, 2007.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/ 11/1 9/asia/asean.php
93 Gillian talks about the lack of an equivalent to Roman law that would have brought about a more formal and
legalistic system. Busse suggests that the decolonization process concentrated power in small elite circles,
institutionalizing a highly private and informal political culture. Barry desker suggests communist influence in the
past made sense to adopt this policy of non-interference. See (Busse, 1999; Desker, 2007; Glaser, 1996)
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example, argues in his analysis on ASEAN cooperation on human rights security that the
"ASEAN way" is becoming counter-productive to the construction of a genuine security
community, and that it tends to be an impediment rather than an enhancer or agency for
human security efforts. 94 ASEAN's position as the foremost multilateral institution in the region
makes it the de-facto forum for institutionalizing cooperation, and thus it's supposed hesitant
and non-committal approach also prevents other multilateral institutions from being the
alternative driver of international cooperation.
More broadly, the "ASEAN way" has been the subject of a debate on ASEAN's role in
promoting security cooperation in the region. Numerous articles, including (Eaton & Stubbs,
2006) and (Simon, 1998), have demarcated and appraised the literature on this topic, and I
encourage the reader to explore this area further. Here, I provide a brief summary of the three
broad schools of thoughts that have locked horns over this issue - neo-realist, constructivists,
and the neo-liberals ideologies - immediately recognizing that such a characterization fails to
capture some of the nuances adopted by scholars in the field.
At one end, neo-realists, led by Michael Leifer (Leifer, 1989), are pessimistic that ASEAN
has any meaningful contribution to make towards the creation of an ASEAN security
community, due to the belief that ASEAN lacks the capacity for compelling its members to
follow rules, nor the ability to get external East Asian nations to abide by them. Neo-realists
view ASEAN security as being peripheral to great power politicking, and thus Ralf Emmers
94 (Saravanamuttu, 2005)
(Emmers, 2003) notes that while there have been a number of ASEAN cooperative
achievements, these have been merely due to balance-of-power concerns in the region; ASEAN
has been unable to enforce cooperation over issues of conflicting interests. Alagappa
(Alagappa, 2003) similarly argues that although security cooperation is possible within ASEAN,
such cooperation is still far in the making, and that there is currently "no present or future
collective political identity... that would modify or subsume national identity and interests".
Jones and Smith have even gone so far as to suggest that ASEAN is "no more than an imitation
community", while others have labeled it a "talk shop masquerading as a potent regional
organization". 95 Neo-realists therefore urge a shift towards a rules-based institution if ASEAN is
to ever become a meaningful security community.
In contrast, the constructivist school of thought adopts the opposing viewpoint, arguing
that ASEAN's non-confrontational bargaining style, rather than being a hindrance to
institutionalized cooperation, have instead been key in bringing states that are at such different
levels of development together. Focusing on more process-related issues such as norms and
changes in perceptions, constructivists such as Simon (Simon, 1998) suggests that ASEAN as an
institution facilitates communication, increases transparency, and reduces uncertainty, thereby
creating a partial security community in Asia. Scholars such as Jetly (Jetly, 2003) and Acharya
(Acharya, 1991) similarly argue that the fact that ASEAN has moved from being "an anarchy of
enemies" to "an anarchy of friends", where national leaders have shifted from mutual fear and
hostility to working towards economic modernization and cooperation, is sufficient evidence
95 See (Jones & Smith, 2002) and (Eaton & Stubbs, 2006) p. 138
that the ASEAN security community has succeeded over the past half century. The unique
"ASEAN Way" method of cooperation has similarly been cited by Stubbs as a reason that
politically sensitive multilateral agreements have not been derailed by the hesitation by some
of its members, allowing them to come onboard at any time. 96
A final school of thought builds off the neoliberal tradition and argues that the ASEAN
security community has already achieved a greater cooperative effect. Beyond arguing that
ASEAN has influenced cooperation norms in the region, neoliberals such as Donald Emmerson
(EMMERSON, 2005) argue that ASEAN is already a security community that is dedicated to
preserving the sovereignty of its members in times of peace. They believe that institutions
lower the transaction costs of cooperation and help enforce rules and norms, and that
information-sharing of military postures can promote regional stability.97 It is even hoped that
in the near future, ASEAN, through security institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), will be able to enhance security cooperation further through the promotion of joint
cooperative military actions.
The debate over ASEAN's role towards promoting regional security cooperation
therefore parallels the theoretical literature on the role of institutions on cooperation, which
emphasizes the use of institutions for nation states to bind themselves and/or others to
cooperation agreements. As discussed in the literature review, the debate that has ensued
between realists and neo-liberals has centered on the intended targets of a binding agreement;
96 (Stubbs, 2000)
97 (Garofano, 2002), p. 5 0 5
realists argue that institutions are essential for states to insure themselves by having
institutions bind others to their commitments, whereas neo-liberals postulate that institutions
are just as important for strong states to bind themselves. 98 In both cases, it is assumed that
nation states are utilizing such institutions for their binding effects. Given this traditional view,
therefore, the inability of ASEAN to bind its member states to multilateral agreements raises
questions of its relevance for promoting cooperation.
Specific to anti-piracy cooperation in the region, Ralf Emmers laments that the
multilateral meetings have not contributed to cooperation because they have merely
"readopted well-known rhetorical stands and repeated formerly made commitments without
introducing cooperative measures".99 As a form of non-traditional security cooperation,
maritime piracy cooperation is difficult because different countries have fluctuating security
interests, varying law enforcement capabilities, as well as sovereignty sensitivities towards
territorial integrity. This problem is exacerbated as ASEAN's non-confrontational approach to
negotiations results in multilateral cooperation developing only to the level acceptable to the
least keen partner.100 Even scholars who are optimistic about the region's prospect for
enhancing international cooperation against maritime piracy are less sanguine about the role of
ASEAN as a regional body. John Bradford suggests that due to the "long-standing insistence
upon non-intervention", ASEAN is unlikely to be the source of major operational measures. 101
98 Please refer to earlier discussions of the realist-neoliberals debate on institutions and cooperation in Chapter 3.
See also, (Jervis, 1999), p. 298
99 (Emmers, 2003)
o00 Refer to Chapter 2 for a more detailed analysis of the difficulties of cooperation. Also, see (Bradford, 2005), p.
81
101 Ibid
100
Similarly, although Tamara Renee Shie argues that "there is indeed room for optimism" for
maritime-piracy cooperation, she admits that the apparent trend of "ad-hoc multilateralism"
threatens permanent cooperation on piracy. 102
5.2 Non-Institutional Cooperation
Given the pessimism towards relying on ASEAN to spearhead regional cooperation in
the region, maritime piracy experts have suggested alternative approaches for effecting anti-
piracy cooperation, such as through the involvement of extra-regional powers and/or bilateral
cooperation between individual states. For instance, Joshua Ho suggests that because ASEAN
and ARF lack enforcement power, the only multilateral initiatives that have borne fruit are
those proposed by the United States and Japan. 103 Extra-regional involvement will be the focus
of Chapter 6; in this section, I analyze the evolution of non-institution-based anti-piracy
cooperation. Analyzing the data over the past decade, I observe a growing network of bilateral
and trilateral cooperation amongst nation states in the region for tackling maritime piracy,
although I disagree with the argument that such a trend therefore implies the irrelevance of
ASEAN for promoting cooperation.
By non-institution-based cooperation, I refer to the subset of cooperation agreements
that are not directly established under the framework of a multilateral institution such as
ASEAN, ARF, Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) or the Five Power Defense Agreement
(FPDA). The majority of this non-institution-based cooperation manifests itself in the form of
101
102 (Shie, 2006)
0o3 (Ho, 2006)
bilateral and trilateral agreements; I therefore use these terms interchangeably in this chapter.
This form of cooperation is often perceived to have a higher probability of materializing than
multilateral cooperation, as discussed in Chapter 2. While multilateral initiatives have to
synthesize a wide range of national interests, bilateral and trilateral agreements can focus on
matching the aligned interests of only a small number of parties. Furthermore, they allow areas
of disagreements to be worked around, and can therefore minimize distrust among
participants. From a game-theoretic framework, fewer players also reduce the likelihood of
defection by a single player, increasing the feasibility of sanctioning defectors and reducing
information costs. 10 4
ASEAN states appear to corroborate cooperation theory with their preference for
bilateral cooperation over security issues. At the 1976 ASEAN Bali summit, calls for a defense
community and alliance were rejected for existing bilateral military ties that were created on a
non-ASEAN basis.105 These bilateral ties were seen as being more flexible, and thereby more
advantageous, than a military alliance, and hence ASEAN states have continued to resist ideas
for a military alliance even in more recent times. 10 6 In the 1970s and 1980s, bilateral security
cooperation in ASEAN centered on border security arrangements between neighboring ASEAN
states, targeting first the Communist insurgency and then transitioning to maritime border
security.107 Over the next decade, these border patrols evolved with the changing security
environment to tackle the growing maritime piracy threat, starting with the joint naval patrols
104 (Oye, 1986)
'0o (Acharya, 1991)
106 However, with the increase of non-traditional security cooperation, there have been renewed calls for an ASEAN
Security Community, and a plan is being finalized for the creation of such a community by 2020. See Ibid.
107 Ibid.
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by Malaysian and Indonesian authorities to fight against piracy, as part of the Malaysia-
Indonesia General Border Agreement. A similar agreement between Malaysian and Thai
authorities allowed for cross-border "hot pursuit" in their coordinated border patrols.108
Nevertheless, some scholars have not been as optimistic about the prospects of non-
institutional-based cooperation as the foundation of ASEAN's strategy against maritime piracy.
On the one hand, Tamara Renee Shie laments that because of the transnational nature of
maritime piracy, "the actions of a single state or even a limited number of states are
inadequate to combat the problem".109 She argues that infrequent cooperation amongst a
subset of countries is insufficient because maritime pirates can simply take their activities into
the territorial waters of another country. Ralf Emmers, on the other hand, argues that because
"some ASEAN countries are not affected by sea piracy and have no incentive in
supporting...measures to fight the problem", countering the piracy threat rested squarely on
the shoulders of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. 110
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Figure 6. Piracy attacks in Asia from 1985 to 2007. (Source: Data created using NGAS anti-shipping messages and
ArcGIS software, with help from MIT Libraries ArcGIS staff)
As an aside, this author first contends the claim that maritime piracy is not an ASEAN-
wide problem. Figure 6 shows the distribution of all piracy attacks in Asia that were either
attempted or carried out between 1985 and 2007, as reported by the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency. The data clearly shows that although the Malacca Straits has had the
greater concentration of piracy attacks in the region, piracy attacks have similarly occurred
within the territorial waters of all nine members of ASEAN that have direct access to the sea
(Landlocked Laos is the only exception). This suggests that maritime piracy is very much a
regional problem, and thus Shie is correct to point out that the efforts of only a subset of
ASEAN member states will be inadequate to combat the threat.
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5.3 "A Spider Web of Cooperation"
Thankfully, the preference for bilateral cooperation does not mean that cooperation
efforts are limited to a minority of ASEAN countries. Instead, a growing number of bilateral and
trilateral agreements for cooperation against maritime piracy are being signed by an increasing
number of countries in the region. The following figures provide a graphical representation of
this trend.
Figure 7a. Joint piracy exercises in Asia up to 2000
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Figure 7b: Joint piracy exercises in Asia up to 2002
Figure 7c: Joint piracy exercises in Asia up to 2004
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Figure 7d: Joint piracy exercises in Asia up to 2007
Figure 7. Graphical representation of the evolution of international cooperation in Asia-Pacific from 2000 - 2007.
A black line represents a joint exercise/patrol/operation that occurred between two countries for the purposes
of increasing cooperation against piracy. (Source: Piracy cooperation database collated by author, 2008. See
Chapter 4 for database details)
Date Countries Involved Cooperation type
(Joint exercise / Joint patrol)
From ~1991 Malaysia, Indonesia Regular Coordinated patrols
From Aug 1992 Indonesia, Singapore Regular Coordinated patrol
From Jul 1998 Thailand, Cambodia Joint patrols
From Jun 1999 Thailand, Vietnam Joint patrols
Aug 2000 India, Vietnam Joint exercise
Aug 2000 India, France Joint exercise
From Nov 2000 Japan, India Annual Joint exercise
Nov 2000 Japan, Malaysia Joint exercise
May 2001 Japan, India, Russia Joint drill
June 2001 WPNS - 16 countries Joint exercise
Jul 2001 Japan, Singapore Joint drill
Jul 2001 Japan, Brunei Joint drill
From Aug 2001 Malaysia, Philippines Joint patrol
Aug 2001 Japan, Thailand Joint mission
Oct 2001 Japan, Philippines Joint mission
Oct 2001 Singapore, Indonesia Joint drill
Nov 2001 Malaysia, Indonesia Joint biannual exercise/patrol
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Mar 2002
May 2002
Aug 2002
Sep 2002
Sep 2002
Mar 2003
Aug 2003
Oct 2003
Oct 2003
Nov 2003
Dec 2003
Feb 2004
From Jul 2004
Sep 2004
Oct 2004
Nov 2004
Mar 2005
May 2005
May 2005
May 2005
Jul 2005
Aug 2005
Sep 2005
Sep 2005
Sep 2005
Nov 2005
Nov 2005
Jan 2006
Jan 2006
Mar 2006
Mar 2006
Jul 2006
Aug 2006
Sep 2006
Nov 2006
Nov 2006
2006
June 2006
Jan 2007
May 2007
April 2007
May 2007
Jun 2007
Aug 2007
Sep 2007
Sep 2007
t
I
Table 4. Chronological list of joint exercises/patrols (Source: Piracy cooperation database collated by author,
2008. See Chapter 4 for database details)
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Japan, Indonesia
Malaysia, Philippines
Japan, Brunei
India, Indonesia
Malaysia, Indonesia
Japan, Philippines
Russia, US, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea
India, Thailand
Malaysia, Philippines
India, China
Japan, Singapore
Japan, Thailand
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia,
FPDA - Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand
United Kingdom
Indonesia, Malaysia
Japan, India
India, Singapore
Western Pacific Naval Symposium - 22 countries
India, Thailand
Malaysia, Indonesia
Malaysia, Philippines
Japan, Brunei
Malaysia, Indonesia
India, United States
FPDA countries
India, Sri Lanka
India, South Korea
Japan, Philippines
India, Bangladesh
France, Brunei
US, Indonesia
India, South Korea
United States, Philippines
FPDA countries
Japan, India
United States, India
Singapore, Korea
India, Thailand
Japan, Malaysia, Thailand
United States, India, Japan
India, Russia
WPNS - 19 countries
United States, Philippines
Malaysia, Indonesia
India, Indonesia
US, Australia, Japan, Singapore, India
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Coordinated patrols
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint patrol
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint drill
Coordinated patrols
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint patrols
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint patrol
Joint exercise
Joint exerrcise
Coordinated patrols
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Coordinated patrol, 3 weeks
Joint exercise
t
t
Figure 7 shows the evolution of non-institutional cooperation in the Asian region over
the past decade, while Table 4 shows the list of joint operations that was used to create the
figures. A line between two countries indicates a joint exercise, patrol or maritime operation
between the law enforcement agencies or navies of the two countries sometime between 1991
and the stated year. Although cooperation can materialize in multiple forms, I have only
represented the three most "operational" forms of cooperation, because these joint activities
actually enables security personnel from multiple countries to interact by working jointly
onboard military and/or patrol vessels to execute an operation against maritime pirates,
simulated or otherwise. These activities in particular enhance coordination at the operational
level, representing concrete steps towards the integration of operations and procedures for
effectively addressing the problem. Finally, it is worth noting that the majority of these joint
activities were conducted between only two or three countries, though some included up to six
countries in a single operation. Only four joint exercises were conducted under any sort of
multilateral framework (FPDA and WPNS), and these were not reflected in Figure 7.
The sequence of figures suggests that there have been an increasing number of non-
institutional joint exercises and patrols against maritime piracy in ASEAN over the past decade.
In the 1990s, joint patrols and exercises against maritime piracy were concentrated around the
three coastal states surrounding the Straits of Malacca, as part of the 1991 Malaysia-Indonesia
General Border Agreement and the 1992 Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrol Agreement.
These coastal states agreed to carry out joint patrols of the Straits up to four times a year,
though in reality these joint patrols were little more than an exchange of schedules that the
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navies themselves often did not adhere to." 1 However, beginning in the late 1990s, a sharp
spike in piracy incidents led to renewed calls for cooperation against maritime piracy. This led
to the establishment of a significant number of agreements for joint anti-piracy exercises and
patrols, many of which were between countries that had heretofore never participated in any
form of security cooperation together. Thailand-Cambodia, Japan-Brunei, and India-Vietnam
were just some of the bilateral cooperation that emerged during this period. Many of these
agreements were amongst subsets of ASEAN countries, though Japan and India were also
frequent partners in these cooperation agreements.
The figures therefore suggest that a network of cooperation is beginning to take shape
in the region, creating what Bradford refers to as the "synergetic network of bilateral
arrangements" 112 This network develops either by the expansion of existing cooperation to
include more nations, or by an informal collation of multiple bilateral agreements into a densely
interconnected system of cooperation. An example of the former was the expansion of the
Malaysia-Indonesia and Indonesia-Singapore bilateral joint patrol agreements into the
MALSINDO patrols in 2004, while Malaysia's increasing portfolio of joint exercises with
countries in the region illustrates the latter trend. As the network becomes increasingly dense,
there is an even greater momentum for cooperation to include additional stakeholders in the
region, including the United States, Australia and Russia. Indeed, the picture of inter-
connectedness then becomes similar to a binding multilateral arrangement, where trust and
understanding are being developed amongst the members, while the ability to customize
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"' (Bradford, 2005)
112 Ibid.
bilateral relationships in a way that maximizes value and minimizes risk is still retained.1 3 This
variety of non-institution-based cooperation has included a whole plethora of law enforcement
agencies, including navies, coast guards, marine police and federal border police officials.
Indeed, one could visualize this evolution as a "spider web of cooperation", rapidly spinning a
successively larger web of inclusive relationships in the region. Bradford may therefore be spot
on in observing that network cooperation holds the "greatest potential for tangible
improvement in regional maritime stability". 1 14
5.4 The Unanswered Question: Network Creation
Given the increasing prevalence of bilateral and trilateral cooperation in the region,
scholars have understandably looked towards bilateral cooperation as the future for combating
piracy in Southeast Asia. However, in so doing, they have actively looked away from
multilateral regional institutions such as ASEAN and the ARF, arguing that these institutions are
no longer critical for the success of regional cooperation. Indeed, the success of bilateral and
trilateral agreements is often used as "an indication that the association [ASEAN] is unable to
achieve a coordinated response among its entire membership". 115
Yet, while piracy experts may applaud the ability for nations in the region to establish
such non-institution-based cooperation, they have not adequately addressed the issue of how
these instances of bilateral cooperation, as well as the ensuing network, have emerged. As
113 Much of the ideas are discussed in Bradford's article on maritime piracy cooperation. Ibid.
114 Ibid.
"5 (Collins, 2003)
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Bradford acknowledges, despite the great potential of such networks for improving regional
security, "such networks are not necessarily easy to create". 116 Not only do potential partners
have to believe that the cooperation has both short- and long-term value, but individual states
also have to overcome domestic politics and/or their lack of resources for successful
cooperation. The fact that joint exercises are conducted between two countries does not
immediately explain why other countries in the region have joined in on the act, especially in
the absence of binding institutions and hegemonic pressure to invoke such cooperation.
In this regard, I drew inspiration from state policymaking (referring to those states
within a country, not the country itself) and explore the theory of policy innovation diffusion,
initially proposed by Walker (Walker, 1969). "Policy innovation" refers to the adoption of policy
ideas that have been implemented by others, rather than the creation of original policy ideas,
which is also known as policy invention in the literature. The theory on policy innovation
comprises a set of models explaining the process through which governments adopt new
programs, and includes both internal determinant and diffusion models, where diffusion refers
to "the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over
time". 117
Various diffusion models exist, including the national interaction model and the regional
diffusion model. 118 In the national interaction model, a communication network among state
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116 {26 Bradford, J.F. 2005} }, p. 83
117 (Rogers, 2003)
118 (Berry & Berry, 1999), p. 171
officials allows them to learn about programs in other states, thereby providing a stimulus for
diffusion to the not-yet-adopting state. 119 National conferences that meet periodically provide
the greatest opportunities for such interaction. Similarly, the regional diffusion model assumes
that states are primarily influenced by states that are geographically adjacent, such as those
that share a border with the state or are within the same region as the state. These states often
have similar economic and social problems, and their similar environments increase the
likelihood that the policies will have similar effects. Underlying these models, however, are
three basic reasons for the spread of policy ideas. Frances Berry and William Berry argue that
while the models hypothesize the strongest communication channels for diffusion, states
ultimately innovate because they 1) learn from one another as they borrow successful
innovations, 2) face competition and are under pressure to conform to nationally accepted
standards, and 3) experience public pressure from their own citizens to adopt such policies.120
5.5 ASEAN: The Platform for Inter-"National Interaction"
Although the theory on policy innovation has mostly been tested on states within a
particular country, this theory can easily be extended to the diffusion of policy ideas across
national boundaries. National governments similarly need to implement policies that address
their nation's pressing problems, and hence policy diffusion may explain a possible source of
policy ideas. In this regard, multilateral regional institutions may have an additional critical role
to play besides being the platform for enforcing binding, multilateral agreements. Regional
institutions, especially those that meet regularly, provide an important opportunity for policy
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119 (V. Gray, 1973)
120 (Berry & Berry, 1999)
diffusion across national borders, allowing government leaders to be constantly exposed to
new policy ideas that could be implemented locally, a-la the national interaction model. Here, I
use maritime piracy cooperation as a probe into the possible roles that ASEAN could play in
promoting policy innovation in the region.
Date Declaration name ASEAN Meeting Venue
Dec ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime: 1st ASEAN Philippines
1997 1) Agreed upon Biennial ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Interior/Home
Crime Affairs Ministers
2) Convene high-level Experts Group to study feasibility of ASEAN Plan Meeting
of action on Transnational Crime and ASEAN Center on Transnational
Crime
Jun 1) Agreed in principle to set up ASEAN Center for Combating 2nd ASEAN Myanmar
1999 Transnational Crime Ministerial
2) Adopted ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime Meeting on
Transnational
Crime (AM MTC)
Oct Joint Communique of the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 3rd AMMTC Singapore
2001 Transnational Crime
1) Recognize the need for region to deal with more forms of
transnational crime, including sea piracy.
Feb Meeting discussed the problem of piracy ASEAN-EU Philippines
2002 1) EU offered assistance for exchanges of technical and practical Experts Group
information, sponsor ASEAN students to attend anti-piracy seminars, Meeting on
exchange experience in managing integration between national Maritime
procedures, establishing training institutions in ASEAN. Security
2) 4.5 million Euro package, eventually began implementation in 2006
Nov Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of 6th ASEAN-China Cambodia
2002 Non-Traditional Security Issues Summit
1) Agree to strengthen information action, personnel exchange,
practical cooperation and joint research on non-traditional security
issues, including piracy
Nov Joint Statement of the First ASEAN-India Summit 8th ASEAN Cambodia
2002 1) Exchanged views and perspectives on non-traditional security threats Summit
such as piracy and agreed to develop concrete programs of cooperation
Jun ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to 10th ASEAN Cambodia
2003 Security Regional Forum
1) Commit to encourage bilateral and multilateral maritime cooperation
among ARF members to combat piracy
2) Institute regional ARF cooperation and training in anti-piracy
3) Provide technical assistance and capability-building infrastructure to
countries
Dec Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring ASEAN-Japan ASEAN-Japan Japan
2003 Partnership in the New Millennium Commemorative
1) Enhance Cooperation in anti-piracy through ARF, APT process, Summit
AMMTC Plus Three
114
Jan Joint Communique of the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 4 h AMMTC & 1s t Thailand
2004 Transnational Crime AMMTC Plus
1) Recognize increasing trends of terrorism and other forms of Three
transnational crime, such as piracy
2) Adopted concept plan to address transnational crime such as piracy
Jul ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Strengthening Transport Security 11t h ASEAN Indonesia
2004 Against International Terrorism Regional Forum
1) Hold appropriate simulation and joint exercises especially on piracy
to enhance institutional capacity building of coastal states and to
ensure effective modal coordination of maritime security
2) Strengthen legal cooperation framework to counter terrorism
3) Strengthen practical cooperation between law-enforcement bodies
4) Promote cooperation between research institutions to examine
terrorism
5) Encourage constructive interaction between ARF and other regional
and multilateral institutions
Nov Joint Declaration of the Leaders at the ASEAN-Australia and New 10 th ASEAN Laos
2004 Zealand Commemorative Summit Summit
1) Take urgent steps to prevent and combat the menace of
transnational crime such as piracy through effective institutional
linkages and cooperation programs
Jul ASEAN - Pakistan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat 12t h ASEAN Laos
2005 Terrorism Regional Forum
1) Agree to implement measures contained in ARF Statement on
Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Security
Nov Joint Communique of the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 5th AMMTC Vietnam
2005 Transnational Crime
1) View with growing concern about transnational crime such as piracy
Dec Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Member 11th ASEAN Malaysia
2005 Countries of ASEAN and the Russian Federation on Progressive and Summit
Comprehensive Partnership
1) Enhance cooperation through actively participating in the ASEAN
Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) - Russian
Federation Consultations
Feb Pact between both regional groupings, EU agree to provide 4.5million Pact between
06 Euros in EU training assistance to border control agencies to reduce EU and ASEAN
arms smuggling and maritime piracy
Jul ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat 39th ASEAN Malaysia
2006 International Terrorism Ministerial
1) Implement measures contained in ARF statements Meeting
Aug Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Partnership 40 th ASEAN Philippines
2007 1) Promote closer cooperation to combat transnational crime such as Ministerial
piracy by undertaking joint activities based on existing agreements and Meeting
mechanisms
Aug Chairman's Statement 14t h ASEAN Regional Forum 14th ASEAN Philippines
2007 1) Ministers noted that incidents of piracy in the region have decreased Regional Forum
substantially in recent years in large part due to cooperation among the
littoral states.
Table 5: Record of all ASEAN declarations, statements and communiques pertaining to piracy cooperation.
The list only includes declarations made that represent the ASEAN community at time of announcement, and
hence does not include cooperation agreements made on the sidelines of ASEAN summits, or announcements
made by particular ASEAN participants during the summit that was not finally jointly announced through a joint
115
statement. Numbered points describe the details of statement as it pertains to anti-piracy cooperation (Source:
ASEAN Secretariat Website. http://www.aseansec.org Last Assessed April 09, 2008)
Table 5 shows the record of all declarations and statements made by ASEAN and ARF as
a collective group since its inception in 1967 that directly pertains to anti-piracy cooperation in
the region.121 The data suggests that contrary to popular perception, the two regional
institutions have enabled their members to reach a significant number of multilateral
agreements over the past decade, especially with regards to maritime piracy cooperation in the
region. In particular, the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, endorsed by
ASEAN Ministers in 2002, and the July 2004 ARF Statement on Strengthening Transport Security
against International Terrorism, introduced a series of anti-piracy counter-measures that
countries agreed to adopt in order to enhance maritime cooperation in the region. With
reference to the summary statistics presented in Chapter 4, these 18 ASEAN and ARF
agreements also account for approximately half of the multilateral agreements for cooperation
against maritime piracy that have been reached in the region.
Despite the multilateral diplomatic activity that ASEAN has managed to achieve,
scholars continue to suggest that bilateral initiatives provide more promise for meaningful
cooperation, since multilateral efforts often only reach the level acceptable to the least keen
partner, or merely reiterate well-known stances of the need for cooperation in the region. 122
Yet, such a view misses the realization that multilateral institutions can in fact facilitate the
121 Only agreements that were made collectively at the ASEAN gatherings were included. For instance, Japanese
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's pronouncement at the 1999 ASEAN summit was not coded in this list because it was
not fully endorsed by all ASEAN members, even though the ASEAN summit was used as a platform for the
announcement.
122 (Bradford, 2005; Emmers, 2003)
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creation of the other forms of cooperation, such as intra-ASEAN bilateral cooperation and
increased interactions with extra-regional powers. The annual ASEAN Heads of State Summits,
annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Foreign Ministers), as well as regular gatherings of senior
officials, technical working groups and task forces provide ample opportunities for the
generation and sharing of ideas. 123 This regular cooperation builds familiarity amongst officials,
lowers transaction costs, reduces distrust and creates habits of cooperation, resulting in
intangible interactions that then form the basis of formal bilateral cooperation agreements
amongst ASEAN participants. More directly, such agreements are often signed and announced
on the sidelines of these ASEAN summits. For example, the "Agreement on Information
Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures" between Indonesia, Malaysia and
the Philippines was signed in Kuala Lumpur in May 2002, on the sidelines of the Special ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism. Thus, although the summits themselves do not always
directly produce "operational" cooperation, they indirectly promote cooperation amongst the
meeting participants. ASEAN has therefore acted as the platform for "policy diffusion".
The ASEAN meetings also facilitate the important cooperation between ASEAN member
states and extra-regional powers in the region. These extra-regional powers are important
partners in the fight against piracy because they provide the much-needed resources and
expertise to effectively combat the threat. In this regard, ASEAN provides an important
platform for extra-regional powers to remain actively engaged in the region. For instance, the
1999 Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation called for an annual summit of ASEAN leaders
123 Please refer to ASEAN website (http://www.aseansec.org) for more details of ASEAN Meeting structures and
mechanisms
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with their counterparts from China, Japan and the Republic of Korea under the ASEAN Plus
Three (APT) process. Similarly, as shown in the table above, ASEAN has successfully made joint
declarations or statements with eight of ASEAN's regional partners that included provisions for
anti-piracy cooperation, including partners such as China, India, Japan, Pakistan, Australia, New
Zealand, the Russian Federation and Canada. Such engagement has not only enabled countries
such as Japan and India to establish a wide variety of anti-piracy bilateral and trilateral
cooperation with multiple countries across the region, but has also provided these extra-
regional powers a platform to make significant policy pronouncements to the region. Japanese
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's proposal at the 1999 ASEAN Manila summit to establish a
"regional coast guard body" and improve cooperation of regional responses to piracy attacks is
a clear example. Compared to the strength of individual Southeast Asian member states, ASEAN
therefore provides a greater voice for the entire community on the world stage, increasing the
likelihood that the collective interests of the ASEAN states will be effectively addressed.
Indeed, non-traditional security threats such as maritime piracy appears to have re-
established regional institutions such as ASEAN as the new centers of international cooperation.
Despite the failed attempts of forming an ASEAN-wide military alliance since its inception in
1967, ASEAN's success at establishing non-traditional security cooperation throughout the
region led to the revival in 2003 of the idea for an ASEAN Security Community, which will be
established by 2020.124 By focusing on transnational threats, where all states in the region have
124 At the ASEAN summit in Bali in October 2003, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II was signed, where
ASEAN leaders agreed to establish an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community, and an
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. See Serverino, Rodolfo C., "Towards an ASEAN Security Communtiy",
Trends in Southeast Asia Series, Issue no. 8, 2004
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an interest in promoting regional security and stability, trust and goodwill can be nurtured
amongst nation states so that the elusive goal of an institutionalized multilateral security
alliance is finally within grasp.
5.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, the data on maritime piracy cooperation in Southeast Asia suggests that
bilateral and trilateral forms of cooperation are indeed the preferred choice of nation states for
taking effective action against the growing problem of maritime piracy in the region, and that
an increasing spider web of cooperation is taking shape. However, instead of implying the
irrelevance of multilateral, non-binding regional institutions such as ASEAN and ARF, this
budding network of cooperation instead reinforces the position of regional institutions as
important platforms for stakeholders to spread the policy of international cooperation further
throughout the region. As Tamara Renee Shie suggests, extra-regional interests in the region
will continue to fluctuate, and hence only sustained cooperation within the region can
sustainably address the piracy issue in Southeast Asia. 125 Leveraging off the facilitating role of
multilateral regional organizations, an ever richer mesh of intra-ASEAN cooperation networks
can be created, boding well for the future security of the region.
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Chapter 6: Coast Guards - Sailing Past Sovereignty Sensitivities
6.1 Introduction
Coastal states that suffer from a high incidence of piracy attacks within their territorial
waters often hope to counter this threat effectively. To be regarded as "piracy-safe" by the
international community enables economic trade to flourish without traders fearing for their
own safety. Unfortunately, these states often lack the necessary resources, both in terms of
technical expertise and the actual quantity of patrol vessels, to adequately deal with the threat.
For instance, Indonesia has a 54,000km long coastline made up of 17,000 islands, 126 making it
impossible for its fledging maritime security forces to cope with the evasive hordes of pirates
that litter its territorial waters.
An obvious solution to this problem is to seek cooperation and assistance from a
growing collection of extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia that are rushing to volunteer their
resources and know-how to the coastal states. By definition, these powers, such as the United
States, Japan, China, India, Australia and South Korea, possess the necessary military
equipment, financial resources, and personnel expertise to better address this non-state threat.
Unfortunately, the prospect that coastal states have to witness fleets of navy destroyers and
gunboats within their own territorial boundaries often raises their sovereignty sensitivities, a
problem I have discussed in Chapter 3. Ironically, although the extra-regional powers are
volunteering their weapons and personnel to help neutralize the piracy threat, thereby
providing important security to the region, the overwhelming presence of their militaries have
126 CIA, "The World Factbook: Indonesia" Last updated 15 May 2008.
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instead drawn the ire of the recipient states. This is especially so in Southeast Asia, where the
history of external involvement in the region has not been exemplary. Coastal states may
therefore be cool to external suggestions for cooperation, and the fierce opposition from
Malaysian and Indonesian officials to the United States' Regional Maritime Security Initiative
(RMSI) proposal is an extreme example of this.
However, a solution to this dilemma appears to have materialized in recent years. In
what Sam Bateman (Bateman, 2003) hails as "a revolution in maritime strategic thinking",
Southeast Asia's extra-regional powers are utilizing their coast guard agencies, as opposed to
their military navies, to successfully create cooperation regimes with their ASEAN counterparts,
building up an increasingly dense network of cooperation to tackle piracy threats in the region.
Countries such as Japan, India and the United States are realizing that their coast guard and
maritime paramilitary agencies equip them with an excellent opportunity to promote security
cooperation in the region, whilst avoiding the political sensitivities that is often associated with
such cooperation.
This chapter analyzes the evolution of coast guard cooperation in Asia, and argues that
with the general alignment of regional and global power interests in Southeast Asia, the coast
guard is and will continue to become an attractive option for extra-regional powers to engage
in anti-piracy efforts in the region, without stoking up the sovereignty fears that are still held by
many of the post-colonized, recently independent nations. In addition, these agencies further
provide a unique opportunity for cooperation amongst the extra-regional powers. I first
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understand the differences in priorities and external perceptions between the navy and the
coast guard, before analyzing how the coast guard may facilitate the avoidance of sovereign
sensitivities in international anti-piracy cooperation. Using some of the data collected in this
thesis, I then analyze the evolution of coast guard cooperation vis-a-vis anti-piracy in the region,
highlighting some of the unique features of coast guard cooperation, such as the engagement
of coast guards between otherwise politically-sensitive nations, as well as the region-approved
transfer of military equipment from one nation to another.
6.2 The Coast Guard and the Navy
Although most nations establish a naval force at the time of their independence, the
creation of a coast guard agency is often perceived to be much less of a pre-requisite for
maintaining one's sovereignty. Over the past decade, however, the coast guard landscape in
Asia has shifted noticeably. Malaysia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Vietnam have all
established their coast guard agencies in the past decade, while both Taiwan and Japan have
restructured their maritime paramilitary forces and renamed them as coast guard agencies. 1 2 7
Coast guards and navies both operate in the same geographical waters. Yet, their
priorities, capabilities, and most importantly, how they are perceived outside their
organizations, often differ significantly. When one thinks of the navy, technologically-advanced
weapon systems and concepts such as network-centric warfare, nuclear frigates, and torpedo-
firing flotilla come to mind. Navies are the maritime military, designed to fight wars and combat
military threats. In the event of a conflict, they have to act decisively to neutralize the threat.
127 Only the English name of the Coast guard was changed (JMSA to JCG). Japanese name remained the same.
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Given these priorities, navies tend to focus on larger, more powerful ships with better weapon
systems, enabling them to project faster and further beyond their shores.
In contrast, the coast guard is often perceived as having a distinct mission set. Its focus
is on ensuring safety within its territorial waters, enforcing the nation's maritime laws and
protecting the maritime environment. As Bateman argues, with the passing of the 1982
UNCLOS agreement, where a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone was granted to all
coastal states, a much larger body of water now needs to be secured and protected. Add on the
perception that the tasks required of the coast guard tends to be more defensive and
technologically-static in nature, and it is not surprising that coast guard agencies require a
larger number of ships that have less capabilities for power projection. In contrast to the navy,
coast guards therefore tend to seek "quantity" over "quality".
There is little doubt that the above depictions of the two organizations are over-
generalizations, and the distinction that has been made should be blurred significantly. For
instance, Colin Gray (C. S. Gray, 2001), p. 118) notes that more than forty of the world's navies
are effectively coast guard agencies, focusing primarily on the coast guard functions that were
listed above and equipped with little power projection capabilities. At the other extreme, the
coast guards of global and regional powers such as the United States and Japan often possess
greater shipping tonnage than most navies in their regions. Nevertheless, this characterization
of the differences between the coast guard and navies is useful, as it explains why coastal states
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may maintain stronger political sensitivities to extra-regional naval involvement in the region,
as opposed to their reactions to similar cooperation through the coast guard.
6.3 The Navy's Difficulty at Forging Cooperation
The perception that great-power navies are focused on power projection and territorial
expansion represents the first hurdle encountered by extra-regional navies that are trying to
promote cooperation with a coastal state. When a coastal state considers the prospect of a
foreign naval ship sailing close to a coastal state's coastline fully armed with highly-advanced
weaponry, for example, it is not irrational for the coastal state to have their security fears
raised, even if the naval ship was on a joint exercise with a neighboring coastal state. The
political sensitivities that arise from navy-based cooperation are particularly apparent when
considering cooperation between extra-regional powers, such as America's "Great White
Fleet", and their counterparts in Southeast Asia, some of whom have no more than a squadron
of ten small crafts. 1 28 Extra-regional powers often have naval capabilities that enable them to
project far beyond their own shores, enabling them to potentially take on the navies of other
great powers. In contrast, most of the navies in Southeast Asia "are not blue-water, power-
projection, sea-control navies - rather regional navies that also enforce laws, protect resources,
conduct search and rescue, prevent environmental damage, and maintain aids to navigation".
129 While this makes Southeast Asian navies ideal candidates for anti-piracy cooperation if we
128 For example, Brunei's navy is made up of a single squadron with 6 patrol crafts and 4 amphibious crafts. For
(Hackett, 2008)
129 (Loy & Stubbs, 1997)
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consider their mission-specifications, their relatively weak capabilities simultaneously raises
their level of insecurity and becomes a potential impediment to cooperation.
However, the sensitivities to naval involvement are not merely a result of disparities in
military capabilities alone. Instead, the possibility of military alliances and naval operations
beyond the publicly announced anti-piracy efforts often results in additional regional
opposition and unnecessary tensions. For instance, there was suspicion that United States'
RMSI program was targeted not only at fighting terrorism in the Malacca Straits, but also to
contain China by creating the capability to block China's access to oil supply from the Middle
East. 130 Southeast Asians therefore did not want to promote a "Sino-America shooting war" in
the Malacca Straits by favoring one military over another. 131
Setting the cooperation in a military context also raises additional security fears. In
introducing RMSI, for example, US Navy commander Admiral Thomas Fargo used terms such as
"expeditionary military capabilities" and "robust maritime interdiction forces". 132 Although
these phrases were targeted at pirates and maritime terrorists, they could have just as easily
stoked the fears of naval commanders from small coastal states. Indeed, it is widely
acknowledged that the negative responses by ASEAN states to suggestions for cooperation
130 (Christoffersen, 2008), p. 136
131 (Zubir & Basiron, 2005)
132Admiral Thomas B .Fargo, commander U.S. Pacific Command, Shangri-La Dialogue, 4th Plenary Session-
"Maritime Security after 9 -11," 1 June 2003. Available online: http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst20031/s
Oh3a0n6q0r ila.shtml.
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against piracy and terrorism were due to the highly militarized counter-terrorism strategy
pursued by the US. 133
One may be quick to re-classify this opposition as simply a reflection of the wave of anti-
Americanism that is spreading around the world, rather than a broader opposition against naval
cooperation. Yet, such opposition to extra-regional naval cooperation was also felt by China,
which had attempted to capitalize on ASEAN's opposition to RMSI by proposing to hold joint
maritime military exercises in non-traditional security issues such as piracy and terrorism. These
efforts were ultimately rejected by ASEAN, which responded that it was not ready to consider a
Chinese military role in the region. 134
Unsurprisingly, there are now increasing calls for great power navies to reconsider their
roles and responsibilities, and reevaluate whether they should remain in the fight against non-
state threats such as piracy and even maritime terrorism. Murphy (murphy, 2007), for instance,
argues that piracy and terrorism are only two items in a longer list of threats to United States
maritime security, and if the US Navy were to confront these two challenges, it would have to
adjust its war-fighting posture towards one that was more similar to its strategy in the
nineteenth century.'13 David Kilcullen (Kilcullen, 2006), p. 413) similarly argues that "naval and
air platforms with networked information capability to generate precision strike" have not
proven effective in response to irregular threats.
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6.4 Coast Guard to the Rescue
Given the potential tensions that could arise from naval cooperation, national coast
guard agencies appear to be an attractive alternative for sailing around the political sensitivities
of international security cooperation. These paramilitary organizations have a lower political
profile than their navy big brother, and are extremely useful for operating in maritime waters
that are either politically sensitive or the subject of overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction.
The coast guard thus becomes extremely useful in the Malacca Straits, since the 200nm
exclusive economic zone provisioned by the 1982 UNCLOS convention leads to overlapping
maritime boundaries in the narrow waterway.
As discussed, it is often assumed that the role of the coast guard is to ensure maritime
safety, enforce maritime law and protect the marine environment in one's territorial waters;
some analysts have even suggested that the "guesswork involved in naval planning is nearly
absent from forecasts bearing upon the coast guard".136 Considered a status quo organization,
coast guard operations are hardly synonymous with the militaristic intentions that may incite
fear in other nations. Because their traditional targets are individuals in mufti,1 37 rather than
other soldiers in uniform, coast guard agencies, with their small patrol vessels, are less
threatening than the larger, more heavily armed "haze-gray warships" of the navy, and could
therefore become useful foreign policy tools for promoting international cooperation.
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This argument for an increased international role for coast guard agencies has
unsurprisingly had its critics. Martin Murphy, in arguing that the US Coast Guard has a limited
international role, contends that the problem of maritime security globally is a political
problem, rather than a law enforcement one.138 He proposes that the distinction that has been
made between coastal operations and deep-water operations, thereby implying a separate role
for the coast guard internationally, is wrong because criminals, insurgents and terrorists have
no hesitation in exploiting this distinction.
Murphy is correct to observe international maritime security is often a political issue,
and that the oft-quoted distinction between brown-water and blue-water operations is
artificial. Yet, what his argument fails to realize is that the coast guard could be successful at
promoting international cooperation precisely because it can approach an otherwise political
problem with a law enforcement perspective, thus skirting many of the political sensitivities
that have been discussed. As Murphy himself recognizes, there is a "current wave of anti-
Americanism that is sweeping the world", one that is related to America's willingness to exert
overwhelming force at any sign of trouble. 139 The use of the coast guard could therefore move
America's foreign policy in a more positive direction - by working jointly with the navy in the
same waters to cooperate with similar organizations internationally, the coast guard could help
redeem America's image in the world today.
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6.5 Coast guard cooperation in Asia
It was previously mentioned that many countries in the region only institutionalized
their coast guard agencies over the past decade. Yet, the idea of using the coast guard as a
means of cooperation is not a new one. According to a 1980 article by Robert Barnett in Foreign
Policy, Australia had previously provided the Philippines with coast guard ships and technical
advice on maritime safety procedures, and the Philippines had conducted joint coast guard
patrols with Indonesia in the South China Sea. 140 More remarkably, a suggestion had even been
made that "ASEAN could create, both for its symbolic and practical function, a jointly operated,
non-military Southeast Asian coast guard and request that Japan finance it".141 This foreign
policy suggestion had been considered by Japanese bureaucrats in then-Japanese Prime
Minister Takeo Miki's office, though the idea was subsequently rejected for domestic political
reasons. Nevertheless, the idea may have been the precursor and inspiration to Prime Minister
Keizo Obuchi's efforts nearly two decades later, where he proposed the setting up of a
"regional coast guard" during an ASEAN summit in 1999.142
Following those nascent attempts at cooperation, international coast guard cooperation
against maritime piracy returned to their negligible levels throughout most of the 1980s and
1990s. One possible explanation for this was that the Southeast Asian region was still reeling
from the Vietnam War, which had placed the region in the cross-fire of Cold War, great power
politics. Vietnam remained a politically-charged issue, and the region wanted to avoid any
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actions that may be construed as an alliance by a subset of countries against others. Under this
geo-political climate, even cooperation amongst coast guards had to be wary of unintended
signaling; cooperation with extra-regional powers could only occur when all countries were
involved. For instance, the regional coast guard suggestion that had been proposed in 1980
emphasized that Vietnam had to be an equal member in the relationship. 143 Furthermore,
feedback from officials in the region revealed that the United States and the Soviet Union could
not be party to neither the negotiations nor the final agreement. The geo-political climate of
the period thus prevented any cooperation with the slightest hint of great-power politics from
materializing.
Nevertheless, Barnett and the Japanese bureaucrat may simply have been two decades
ahead of their time. Coast guard cooperation between extra-regional powers and costal states
has emerged in the past decade, and is now increasingly used to promote stability in Southeast
Asia. As Bateman suggests, coast guards now have "the potential to make a major contribution
to regional order and security". Coast guard cooperation can be broadly classified into four
main types of cooperation. They include providing technical expertise by offering anti-piracy
training to coast guard officials, holding joint exercises and patrols between coast guards,
hosting multi-lateral meetings of coast guard heads, and transferring coast guard equipment to
assist in the establishment of new coast guard agencies. Each of these cooperation types will
now be described in turn.
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6.5.1 Training of Coast Guard officials
Beginning with what may be considered the most innocuous form of cooperation, extra-
regional powers are educating anti-piracy personnel from Southeast Asian agencies through
their coast guard agencies. This training often includes a transfer of expertise on the use of anti-
piracy equipment, as well as knowledge transfer on how the coastal waters can be patrolled
effectively. Such training may appear superficial and unnecessary but have actually been of
great value to the recipients, due to the primitive state of many of the coastal states' coast
guard agencies. Often established within the past decade, many of the Southeast Asian coast
guards are considered to be of lower priority than their naval counterparts for ensuring
national security, and hence lack both the technical expertise and resources to effectively
combat the threat. This provides an excellent opportunity for extra-regional coast guard
agencies to fill an important gap in anti-piracy efforts in the region.
Japan's leadership in this regard is a clear example of the level of cooperation that can
be achieved through this channel. Starting in 2000, Japan has hosted a regular series of training
sessions and seminars for coast guard officials in the region, and through the Japanese
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), has funded other law enforcement training seminars
throughout the region. In April 2001, Japan enrolled 5 ASEAN Coast Guard employees, one each
from Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam, into the Japan maritime safety
academy for training, where the students studied navigation and communication for between
two and five years. Although not unique to the Coast Guard (such international student
exchanges are also common in the military), such efforts represent the first step towards closer
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cooperation between nations, especially when the international student sails into his home
port onboard a Japanese training ship for joint exercises with the coastal state. 144
In 2002, Japan further extended its training initiatives with a 5-year training program for
the Philippines Coast Guard (PCG), entitled the JICA-PCG Human Resource Development (JICA-
PCG HRD) initiative. Focused on enhancing the capabilities of Filipino personnel through a range
of law enforcement training courses and activities, the project organized no less than 30
interactions, exchanges and training courses for the PCG within the first two years of its
inception. 145 This included JCG officials instructing their PCG counterparts how to perform ship
inspections and handling criminal evidence from the sea, as well as the monitoring the PCG
education training system to provide an international view and share best practices. Although
such efforts are not resource-intensive or time-consuming, they undoubtedly enhance the
indigenous capabilities of the local coast guard, while simultaneously promoting trust between
the participating nations.
6.5.2 Joint Exercises and Patrols
In the realm of cooperation against maritime piracy, joint exercises, patrols and other
similar operations are often regarded as the holy grail of cooperation. Any activity that brings
together the maritime security officials of multiple nations to execute an operation using real
equipment and ships will be widely hailed by leaders of all countries involved that cooperation
has reached "a new level". This excitement is not unwarranted. A joint exercise, which brings
144 This occurred during one of the Japan-Philippines joint exercise
145 JICA-PCG HRD Project Activities, 2002-2004
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together two or more agencies and acts out a piracy attack scenario, provides valuable
opportunities for both sides to learn about the anti-piracy operations of their counterparts,
enhances communication across territorial boundaries, and coordinates actions and protocols
in the event of an actual piracy attack. Ideally, these joint exercises will eventually lead to joint
patrols, where officials in different uniforms, either jointly or by coordinating ship schedules,
conduct actual operations to prevent piracy attacks from taking place.
At the time of writing, joint exercises and patrols are the highest level of international
cooperation that has been achieved against maritime piracy. I therefore attempt to understand
the level of cooperation achieved by coast guard agencies in the region by analyzing the
frequency of joint exercises and patrols that have occurred.
From Jan 1991 Malaysia, inaonesia
From Aug 1992 Indonesia, Singapore
From Jul 1998 Thailand, Cambodia
From Jun 1999 Thailand, Vietnam
From Aug 2001 Malaysia, Philippines
Oct 2001 Singapore, Indonesia
Nov 2001 Malaysia, Indonesia
May 2002 Malaysia, Philippines
Sep 2002 Malaysia, Indonesia
Oct 2003 Malaysia, Philippines
From Jul 2004 Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Oct 2004 Indonesia, Malaysia
May 2005 Malaysia, Indonesia
Jul 2005 Malaysia, Philippines
Sep 2005 Malaysia, Indonesia
Aug 2007 Malaysia, Indonesia
Aug 2000 India, Vietnam
Nov 2000 Japan, Malaysia
Jul 2001 Japan, Singapore
Keguiar oorainatea patrols
Regular Coordinated patrol
Joint patrols
Joint patrols
Joint patrol
Joint drill
Bi-annual joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Coordinated patrols
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint patrol
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint drill
Navy
Navy, Marine Police
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Police
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Police
Marine police
Navy
Coast Guard
Coast Guard
134
1_J1~
Jul 2001
Aug 2001
Oct 2001
Mar 2002
Aug 2002
Sep 2002
Mar 2003
Oct 2003
Dec 2003
Feb 2004
Mar 2005
May 2005
Aug 2005
Nov 2005
Jan 2006
Mar 2006
Mar 2006
Aug 2006
2006
June 2006
Jan 2007
Jun 2007
Sep 2007
Sep 2007
Joint drill
Joint mission
Joint mission
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Coordinated patrols
Joint exercise
Joint patrol
Japan, Brunei
Japan, Thailand
Japan, Philippines
Japan, Indonesia
Japan, Brunei
India, Indonesia
Japan, Philippines
India, Thailand
Japan Singpor
Japan, Thailand
India, Singapore
India, Thailand
Japan, Brunei
India, Philippines
Japan, Philippines
France, Brunei
USA, Indonesia
.USA, Philippines
Singapore, South Korea
India, Thailand
Japan, Malaysia, Thailand
United States, Philippines
India, Indonesia
USA, Australia, Japan, Singapore, India
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
Joint exercise
3 weeks Coordinated patrol
Joint exercise
Aug 2000 India, France Joint exercise Navy
From Nov 2000 Japan, India Annual Joint exercise Coast Guard
May 2001 Japan, India, Russia Joint drill Coast Guard,
Federal Border Service
Aug 2003 Russia, USA, China, Japan, South Korea, Joint exercise Navy
North Korea
Nov 2003 India, China Joint exercise Navy
Nov 2004 Japan, India Joint exercise Coast Guard
Sep 2005 India, USA Joint exercise Navy
Nov 2005 India, Sri Lanka Coordinated patrols Navy
Nov 2005 India, South Korea Joint exercise Coast Guard
Jan 2006 India, Bangladesh Joint exercise Coast guard
Jul 2006 India, South Korea Joint exercise Navy
Nov 2006 Japan, India Joint exercise Coast guard
Nov 2006 USA, India Joint exercise Navy
May 2007 USA, India, Japan Joint exercise Coast Guard, Navy
April 2007 India, Russia Joint exercise Navy
June 2001 WPNS - 16 countries Joint exercise Navy
Sep 2004 FPDA- 5 countries Joint exercise Navy
May 2005 WPNS- 22 countries Joint exercise Navy
Sep 2005 FPDA- 5 countries Joint exercise Navy
Sep 2006 FPDA - 5 countries Joint exercise Navy
May 2007 WPNS -19 countries Joint exercise Navy
Table 6. Joint Exercises and Patrols Held by Military and Paramilitary Organizations in Asia. (Source: Piracy
cooperation database collated by author, 2008. See Chapter 4 for database details)
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Joint exercise
Joint drill
Coast Guard, Police
Coast Guard
Coast Guard
Coast Guard
Coast Guard, Police
Navy
Coast Guard
Navy
Coast Guard
Coast Guard
Navy
Navy
Coast Guard
Coast guard
Coast Guard
Navy
Navy
Navy
Coast Guard
Navy
Coast Guard
Navy
Navy
Navy
Joint exercise
Joint patrols
Table 6 shows a summary of joint exercises, operations and patrols that have taken
place in Asia over the past two decades, and indicates the national agencies that were involved
in the cooperation. Because the focus here is on comparing the relative ability of coast guard
agencies and navies in facilitating cooperation against maritime piracy, only activities where at
least two paramilitary or military organizations met and worked alongside each other for
purposes of combating piracy were coded. These joint activities had to be more than "table-
top" exercises, involving actual ships, weaponry equipment and security personnel. Finally,
these joint operations were coded only if the media publicly reported that the activity had been
successfully organized.
Although this author recognizes that the collated data may be incomplete and/or that
the sub-type distinction of joint exercise or joint patrol is often blurred, the collated data sheds
important light on the value that extra-regional powers stand to gain from using their coast
guard agencies for promoting cooperation. Amongst coastal states, cooperation remains
centered on the naval establishment, and I hardly witness any attempts at inter-coast guard
cooperation within Southeast Asia. The most recently established MALSINDO patrols, for
example, involved seventeen naval ships from the three coastal states surrounding the Malacca
Straits, and the patrols were launched aboard an Indonesian navy ship with the top military
brass from all three coastal states.146
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A different story emerges when we analyze the cooperation between extra-regional
powers and the coastal states. The data suggests that until recently, utilizing one's coast guard
may have been the only means for extra-regional powers to establish joint exercises with the
coastal states. The Japanese Coast Guard took the lead in the region by conducting joint
exercises with their counterparts from the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore
and Brunei, frequently deploying its 9,140 Shikishima coast guard ship, equipped with two
helicopters, to the region to work closely with local officials. Indeed, over the three years
starting from 2000, Japan sent more than ten patrol vessels to Southeast Asia in cooperation
with local authorities. Although I have since witnessed similar efforts by the region's navies to
combat maritime piracy cooperatively, coast guard joint exercises continue to take place at a
high frequency, cementing the role of the coast guard as an effective foreign policy tool for
fostering cooperation in Southeast Asia.
Similarly, a new network of coast guard exchanges is developing at the extra-regional
level. Extra-regional powers, including Japan, India, South Korea and the United States, are
cooperating with each other, independent of the coastal states, to share expertise on
conducting anti-piracy operations, advance maritime interdiction technology, and work
towards joint leadership in providing stability to the region. What is remarkable from this
institutional cooperation is less that coast guard agencies are able to work together against a
common threat, but rather that such bilateral cooperation has managed to develop without
raising concern from other extra-regional powers, most notably China.
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Looking at the data, one may be tempted to argue that the evolution of anti-piracy
cooperation is less a story of coast guard effectiveness than of shrewd Japanese foreign policy.
The majority of coast guard joint exercises involve Japan, and other extra-regional powers, such
as India and the United States, have continued to conduct joint naval exercises with their
Southeast Asian counterparts. Yet, coast guard cooperation is not unique to Japan. The Indian
Coast Guard (ICG) has similarly increased coast guard involvement in the region, even if the
Indian navy had taken the lead initially. The ICG has held joint exercises with Japan, the
Philippines, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. This is above and beyond the training
workshops that the ICG has conducted for the Myanmar navy, as well as the ICG being a
signatory to Japan's Asian Maritime Security Initiative (AMSI). 147 Furthermore, in the clearest
sign of the potential for coast guard cooperation, the ICG held "an unprecedented exchange of
visits between the coast guards of India and Pakistan" in 2005, establishing a communication
link and signing a Memorandum of Understanding between the coast guards of both countries.
The ability of the coast guard to sail around political sensitivities and promote cooperation
between recent enemies is most certainly what naval commanders can only dream of.
6.5.3 Multilateral meetings
Another area for extra-regional powers to utilize their coast guards is through the
organization of multilateral meetings among coast guard agencies in the region to promote
interaction and future collaboration. Often, these gatherings are fertile grounds for establishing
information-sharing programs, joint exercises, etc. Beginning in March 2000, Japan has held
147 India's press release about international coast guard phenomenon.
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regular meetings for officials and heads of coast guard agencies in the ASEAN region, discussing
proposals for greater anti-piracy cooperation and seeking the consensus of all the countries
represented. In 2002, coast guards from 14 Asian nations agreed to create a network to
exchange piracy information on a daily basis. In 2004, Japan hosted the inaugural Heads of
Asian Coast Guard Agencies meeting in Tokyo, where all coast guard agencies attending
unanimously adopted Japan's AMSI program, in direct contrast to the coastal state's response
to the United States' RMSI program in 2003.
Due to the defensive nature of these agencies, a meeting of coast guard agencies can
hardly be misinterpreted as an alliance against its non-participants. This means that although
strongly encouraged, it is not necessary for regional gatherings of coast guard agencies to
include all members in the region just so as to prevent misunderstanding from the non-
participants. For instance, the coast guard meetings that have been held in Asia over the past
decade have ranged from between ten and sixteen countries each year, managing to make
progress on international cooperation even without full attendance by all countries in the
region.
This informal participatory structure extends to the collaboration format in many of
these meetings. Focused on non-confrontational discussions and asking each country to
contribute only as much as it wishes, these meetings attempt to stay under the political radar,
aiming to forge consensus rather than competition. The North Pacific Coast Guard Forum is an
excellent example of this cooperation. Initiated by the JCG in 2000 as an informal forum to
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promote cooperation, the forum brings together the coast guard agencies from Canada, China,
Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. Structurally, the forum adopts a rotating
chair format and meets in a different host country each year, focusing on promoting discussions
and working on issues that are of common interests to all the parties involved. Politically, the
participants insist on a low profile for the forum, refusing to sign binding treaties or entertain
much media attention. 1 48 This preference is only possible because unlike navy collaboration,
which has to emphasize transparency to avoid international suspicion, coast guard agencies are
able to focus on the substance of cooperation and be less concerned with geo-political
sensitivities.
Yet, an informal cooperation structure does not equate to the lack of substantive
cooperation; important breakthroughs have been achieved when all parties operate in a non-
political atmosphere. At the 2005 NPCGF meeting, for instance, coast guards from the United
States, China, Russia and Japan conducted combined operations at sea. 149 The United States
Coast Guard also subsequently expanded cooperation with its Chinese counterparts "quietly,
out of the public eye", and by December 2006, were riding in each other's vessels for patrolling
fishing areas and scrutinizing port security on each other's coast.'1s Similarly, U.S. and Russian
Coast Guards held joint exercises against illegal fishing in 2005. The informal NPCGF meeting
has therefore led to unprecedented cooperation amongst Asia-Pacific regional powers, and
since its inception at the turn of the century, has persisted as the sole operational, multi-lateral
148 Private conversations with Commandant Thad Allen, USCG commandant
149 Admiral Thad Allen, "Statement regarding his Participation in the 8th North Pacific Coast Guard Forum
Summit" St. Petersberg, Russia, September 7, 2007
150o "US Coast Guard Cutter Makes First Visit to China", Xinhua News Agency, June 12, 2006
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maritime safety and security regime in Asia-Pacific. l s5 Indeed, the success of the NPCGF has
acted as a model for other coast guards, leading to the inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic
Coast Guard Forum in October 2007, bringing together United States, Canadian and European
coast guard agencies in a similarly informal dialogue. 152
6.5.4 Assistance in Establishing Coast Guard/Transfer of Equipment
Finally, extra-regional coast guard agencies appear to be fostering an enhanced level of
cooperation in the region through their direct involvement in increasing the law enforcement
capabilities of coastal states' coast guard agencies. Although the U.S. Navy has donated patrol
ships to piracy-prone regions such as Panama to help combat piracy in the past, such transfers
of equipment have been unprecedented in Asia, once again probably due to the political
sensitivities of the region. Nevertheless, in March 2006, Japan handed two navigation vessels to
the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) to help in anti-piracy efforts, and
similarly donated three patrol boats each to Indonesia and the Philippines, with plans for more
in the near future. 5 3
Similar to offering technical training to local coast guard officials, the transfer of law
enforcement equipment such as patrol vessels is critical for improving the indigenous
capabilities of the coast guard agencies in the region, enabling them to combat the piracy
151 (Samuels, 2008)
152 Admiral Thad Allen, "Statement regarding his Participation in the 8th North Pacific Coast Guard Forum
Summit" St. Petersberg, Russia, September 7, 2007
153 Initially Japan had considered donating two decommissioned destroyers to Malaysia, but in the end the
navigation vessels were given instead. Refer to Table 2 for more details on such transfers of law enforcement
equipment
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threat more effectively. Assuming that both coastal and user states alike are primarily
interested in eradicating the maritime piracy threat, enabling local coast guards to become
more self-dependent actually reduces the long-term resource burdens on the extra-regional
power. In addition, from an organizational perspective, assisting coastal states in setting up
their coast guard agencies facilitates future international cooperation, since it centralizes a
country's anti-piracy efforts under a single organization. For example, before Malaysia's coast
guard agency, the MMEA, was established, Malaysia had 22 different authorities from 14
separate government ministries that had some maritime law enforcement role, as well as more
than 26 government departments that were in some way responsible for the management of
the maritime sector.154 Such bureaucracy may explain Malaysia's lack of participation in inter-
coast guard cooperation in the past, and hence Japan's assistance in this regard bodes well for
greater external collaboration in future.
Once again, what is remarkable about this form of cooperation is the ease with which
the cooperation has developed, since it has managed to avoid the traditional opposition that
one would have expected from neighboring countries, in response to such transfers of military-
capable equipment. This is particularly so in the case of Japan, which is not only perceived to be
distrusted by its neighbors over its military intentions, but also faces domestic opposition to any
apparent attempts by its leaders to revisit its militaristic past. Malaysian and Indonesian
embrace, and Japan's domestic acquiescence, of these gifts from Japan therefore suggests that
focusing on coast guard cooperation may be an attractive means of skirting around otherwise
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politically-sensitive issues. 15ss Indeed, because these ships were not being supplied to foreign
navies, Japan's leaders successfully argued domestically that this transfer did not contravene
Japan's arms export ban, leading some to even suggest that this desire for non-military
engagement explains Japan's enthusiasm towards helping Malaysia and Indonesia set up their
respective coast guards. s6 Had the respective navies been involved instead, such a transfer of
arms would have been highly improbable.
6.6 Conclusion
It has been nearly a decade since Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi revitalized the
idea of a regional coast guard body in Asia. Since then, Japan has taken the lead in using its
coast guard agency to engage the region in anti-piracy cooperation at multiple levels, and in so
doing, has helped generate an increasingly dense network of cooperation in the region. Indeed,
Richard Samuels (Samuels, 2008), p. 103) even suggests that the JCG is "appearing at the center
of an emerging Southeast Asian security framework, and this leadership is welcomed by East
Asian neighbors".
Japan's model, and increasingly one that is also adopted by India, suggests that coast
guard agencies may provide the critical link between the resource needs of coastal states and
the abundant capabilities possessed by the extra-regional powers. In addition, they may hold
the key to building an outer-ring of cooperation amongst the regional powers, locking down a
155 There were even suggestions of Indonesian and Malaysia frustration of a lack of greater transfers due to Japan's
self-imposed export ban.
156 (Samuels, 2008), p. 103
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strong sense of stability and security in the region. While one would be naive to think that coast
guard agencies alone will be able to achieve a level of cooperation that has eluded nations in
the region for so long, the promising signs of cooperation over the last decade suggest that
those seemingly insignificant patrol vessels have a huge role to play in international
cooperation. Coast guards appear to be a viable solution for sailing past the sovereignty
sensitivities that have been one of the biggest hindrances of anti-piracy cooperation in the
region.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
I began this thesis with the observation that international cooperation against maritime
piracy is rapidly developing in Asia, even though traditional theories of international security
cooperation suggest that we should not be witnessing international cooperation against
traditional security threats. I therefore proposed that at least in the realm of international
cooperation against non-traditional security threats such as maritime piracy, even without the
existence of binding, rules-based institutions, consensus-based regional groupings such as
ASEAN have promoted maritime piracy cooperation by facilitating regional interaction and the
diffusion of cooperation ideas. Such groupings have enabled cooperation to develop in a
diffused manner throughout the Southeast Asian region, without having to rely on a single
country to act as the central node. I have also shown that rather than requiring the presence of
a security hegemon to provide cooperation stability in the region, Asia has instead managed to
promote non-traditional security cooperation against the maritime piracy threat through the
adroit use of national coast guards by numerous extra-regional powers, thereby promoting and
enhancing international cooperation in a disarming manner.
This thesis does not profess to claim that I have disproved either of the two traditional
theories on international security cooperation. Rather, I suggest that despite the theorizing that
has been accomplished on international cooperation vis-a-vis state threats, we need to rethink
our theories when we analyze international cooperation against non-state actors such as
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maritime pirates. Traditional theories on international cooperation cannot be naively applied to
the domain of non-traditional security threats.
What does the research in this thesis therefore suggest about international cooperation
against non-traditional security threats, an issue that appears to have re-emerged in the past
decade? Specific to international cooperation vis-a-vis maritime piracy, our findings first
suggest that significant potential exists for establishing international cooperation to tackle the
problem in other piracy-infested regions of the world. None of the explanations that I have
explored in this thesis have been Asia-constrained, and hence the criteria for promoting
cooperation should be readily portable on an international scale. Nevertheless, cooperation can
only materialize if countries are willing to recognize and seek out areas of common interests,
which, in the case of cooperation against non-state threats, should theoretically be abundant.
Our experience in Asia also suggests that piracy is often rampant in regions of
lawlessness, where the state is weak and the state apparatus faces a high risk of breaking
down. One solution for dealing with the piracy problem is therefore to accept a greater
involvement by strong powers external to the region. To increase their likelihood of acceptance
by the weaker states, however, our analysis from Chapter 6 suggests that the stronger
countries should avoid employing their navies to implement the cooperation, but should
instead attempt to use less military-related assets, such as the coast guard, to perform these
security tasks. Indeed, the United States appears in recent times to be engaging in an increasing
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amount of cooperation at the coast guard level, seeking to help weaker states around the world
build up their institutional law enforcement capability.l5 7
On the broader level, the unusually high level of cooperation against maritime piracy in
Asia ironically suggests that such threats may actually be conducive for promoting greater
security cooperation in Asia. Being able to cooperate against a common transnational threat
provides countries with the unique opportunity to form closer security relationships without
having to compromise their ties and alliances with other countries. Because of the maritime
piracy threat, we have witnessed cooperation between China and Taiwan, Japan and China,
Japan and India, and even United States and North Korea - pairs of countries that we would not
have expected to witness any sort of cooperation, let alone military cooperation.
In this vein, US Navy Commander-in-Chief for Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis C. Blair,
has cited anti-piracy as one of the common interests that America intends to leverage on in
order to shift from its existing bilateral security treaties towards multilateral security
communities in the region, and that these multilateral initiatives would even include China as
an active participant.l s8 Cooperation against non-traditional security threats may therefore
provide a means for promoting greater international cooperation amongst nation states, and
this may even be cross-applied to other regions around the world. Indeed, Andreas and
Nadelman (Andreas, P. and Nadelman, E., 2006), p. 190) have even suggested that a new type
157 Private conversations with USCG commandant Thad Allen
' Statement Of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.s. Navy Commander In Chief U.S. Pacific Command
Before The House International Relations Committee Subcommittee On East Asia And The Pacific And
Subcommittee On Middle East And South Asia, On the US Pacific Command Posture, 27 April 2002.
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept il/blair 007.htm
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of security community may be developing across the Atlantic, one that is "based more on
policing alliances against non-state actors than traditional security alliances against state-based
military threats".
7.2 Suggestions for Future Work
I have sought to answer a number of important questions in this thesis. Nevertheless,
significant areas need to be further expanded upon for us to possess a full understanding and
appreciation of international cooperation against maritime piracy.
First, the existing database presented in Chapter 4 has focused on recording, as
comprehensively as possible, all instances of cooperation that have occurred. Implicit in this
focus is an assumption that each of these cooperation agreements and initiatives has been
equally effective. However, as I have discussed in Chapter 4, some piracy analysts have
contended that these cooperation agreements are not only ineffective, but possibly counter-
productive as well. One possible response would be for us to point to general statistical trends,
such as the drop in piracy attacks in the region over the past few years, or the fact that
Indonesia is no longer the most piracy-infested country in the world, as evidence that the
cooperation has succeeded. The more appropriate response, however, instead requires a
detailed analysis of the direct effect of particular cooperation agreements on eradicating
maritime piracy, and the mechanics by which international cooperation has led to the reduction
in maritime piracy in the region.
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Another natural area of future research is to extend the analysis of international
cooperation in Asia to other regions that have similar rates of piracy attacks. This is particularly
relevant given the new spate of high-profile piracy attacks that have recently taken place off
the coast of Somalia.l s9 It would therefore be interesting to trace the development of
international cooperation in a different region of the world, so as to compare and contrast the
different approaches adopted to fight maritime piracy across a variety of regions. In this regard,
the Indian Ocean provides another region where international cooperation can be analyzed,
given the similarly high incidence of piracy attacks in that region. Analyzing what remains
invariant across the different regions will shed greater light for understanding both the root
causes of the problem, as well as the necessary solutions to eradicate maritime piracy and
other transnational threats.
159 As this thesis is being written in April 2008, there have been high profile cases of Somalia pirates hijacking
French yachts
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